


Cape of  
Good Hope

## **UNDER FIRE ELEPHANTS IN THE FRONT LINE**

*A second report by  
The Environmental  
Investigation Agency*





*'Love and protection'*  
by Gary Hodges

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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


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# INTRODUCTION

► Elephants in Chobe National Park / Gleizes / EIA



## INTRODUCTION

The elephants of southern Africa are under fire in the front line of a conflict that has raged for over two decades. The devastation that has been inflicted is immeasurable.

The African elephant disaster can be attributed to a combination of well known factors. The frivolous consumption of thousands of tonnes of ivory by northern and far eastern societies; the Hong Kong ivory barons who exploited loopholes in international trade regulations; corrupt government officials; poverty stricken poachers; complacent, overpaid conservationists, all conspired to engineer the

spectacular decline in the continent's elephant populations.

The Appendix I listing of the African elephant has proved to be a resounding success in countries which have demonstrated the political will to implement the ban on trade in elephant products.

But in southern Africa the poaching holocaust continues to be driven by brutal military forces that have claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Africa's elephants as a sideshow to their armed crusades. It is these forces, encouraged and supported by the competing ideologies of east and west, that are responsible for so much of the damage that has been inflicted on Africa.

After a week in South Africa and Zimbabwe - the two

# INTRODUCTION

countries leading the campaign to overturn the ban - a "panel of experts" has concluded that both nations can downlist their elephant populations to Appendix II of CITES, just two years after the achievement of the ban on international trade in elephant products.

What the panel has completely overlooked are the military forces that provide the dominant force behind illegal trading in the region. South Africa and Zimbabwe are on opposite sides in the war which still rages in Mozambique - a war that has turned Mozambique's renowned national parks into ecological deserts.

Angola and Mozambique were once home to well over 100,000 elephants. But years of civil war have reduced them to relic populations living in a state of siege. The Angolan war is over, but not before tens of thousands of elephants were slaughtered to fund the joint campaign waged by Unita rebels and the South African Defence Force.

The Zimbabwe National Army and the South African Defence Force are deeply involved in the Mozambique elephant disaster. But their respective governments have either turned a blind eye or been complicit in a cover-up of the truth.

Military involvement in poaching and smuggling is like a disease that neutralises enforcement capability and infects a nation with an illness invariably fatal for elephants. If Zimbabwe and South Africa had committed the same energy and resources to cracking down on military poaching and smuggling as they have to their misinformation campaign against Appendix I in the past two years, their elephant populations and those of adjacent countries would not be facing the threats they do today.

The on-going war in Mozambique is undermining efforts to conserve elephants in the adjacent countries of Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and South Africa. It is condemning Mozambique's elephants to inevitable extinction and destroying a natural resource which may prove vital in rescuing Mozambicans from their present poverty.

While Zimbabwe points the finger at the poaching disaster that afflicted Kenya for 15 years, a closer look reveals an identical pattern of poaching and government complicity in Zimbabwe itself. The involvement of Zimbabwe National Army troops in poaching in Mozambique led to an outbreak of intense poaching in Gonarezhou National Park. This has now spread to many other areas such as Chizarira which is littered with elephant and rhino carcasses in its "frozen zones". This is an open secret among Zimbabwean conservationists but their repeated appeals to government

ministers to deal with the situation have gone unheeded.

Meanwhile, the South African Defence Force appears to be out of control. The peace agreement signed in 1984 with the Mozambique government - the Nkomati Accord - whereby South Africa agreed to end support for Renamo insurgents, has been repeatedly broken. The scandalous use of Kruger National Park as a military base for supporting Renamo and the hidden agenda that appears to be behind its extension into Mozambique destroys any suggestion that ivory trading can be adequately controlled in either South Africa or the region as a whole.

The newly elected government in Zambia makes no attempt to hide the involvement of security forces, police and parks personnel in poaching. It has already demonstrated its commitment to the elephant and overturned the decision of the previous government by withdrawing its reservation to the Appendix I listing and its downlisting proposal. Zambians deserve praise for their actions and support in their efforts to help save the last of the country's depleted elephant herds.

In contrast, the exaggerated and distorted claims made by Zimbabwe and South Africa to justify resumed international trade in elephant products are undermining all that is good in their wildlife policies. South Africa should listen to its head of National Parks, Dr Robbie Robinson, who has laid his career on the line and spoken out against his government's attempt to reopen the ivory trade.

Zimbabwe, for its part, seems determined to undertake another unilateral declaration of independence - this time for elephants. But the world does not end at Zimbabwe's borders and neither does the highly migratory elephant population that it shares with Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Namibia.

Urgent measures are needed to establish effective mechanisms that will ensure regional co-operation in enforcement, management planning and scientific research to secure the long term conservation of southern African elephants. Such regional co-operation is years away if the present climate persists. But no downlisting of any southern African elephant population to Appendix II should be contemplated before it is established and functioning. Until then, the fate of Africa's elephants will hang in the balance.

## ALLAN THORNTON

Chairman, Environmental Investigation Agency  
31st January 1992

## Appendix I - The Success Story

- ◆ Poaching falls steeply in East and Central Africa.
- ◆ Ivory prices plummet across Africa.
- ◆ Retail sales down by 50% in Japan.
- ◆ Prices down in Europe, Japan and the USA.
- ◆ Hong Kong shops and factories close.
- ◆ United Arab Emirates pledge to burn 12 tonnes.
- ◆ Taiwan and India burn ivory.
- ◆ US and EC sales collapse, despite huge discounts.
- ◆ Elephants start to re-colonise former range.

# CONF. 7.9

## THE CRITERIA FOR DOWNLISTING AFRICAN ELEPHANT POPULATIONS

At the 7th Conference of the Parties to CITES, a resolution was agreed which established criteria for the transfer of African elephant populations from Appendix I to Appendix II. Resolution Conf. 7.9 established terms of reference for a "Panel of Experts" to review information on elephant populations and ivory trade when downlistings from Appendix I to Appendix II are proposed.

In evaluating the status and management of an elephant population the agreed criteria are:



### MANAGEMENT

1. The viability and sustainability of any population and potential risks.
2. The affected range state's demonstrated ability to monitor the subject population.
3. The effectiveness of current anti-poaching measures.

The terms include:

1. The scientific evidence regarding their numbers and trends.
2. The practices of conservation and management of these populations and threat to their status.
3. The adequacy of ivory trade controls.

In evaluating the affected range state's ability to control trade in ivory from African elephants, the criteria are:



### ENFORCEMENT

1. Whether total levels of off-take from both legal and illegal killing are sustainable.
2. Whether control of ivory stocks is adequate to prevent the mixing of legal and illegal ivory.
3. Whether law enforcement is effective.
4. Whether enforcement and controls are sufficient to ensure that no significant amounts of ivory taken or traded illegally from other countries are traded within or through the territory of affected range state.

EIA supports Conf. 7.9 but believed in 1989, as now, that no country can fulfil the criteria. The ivory poaching and smuggling network is deeply entrenched and will take many years to eradicate. The tentacles of the illegal ivory trade reached everywhere in Africa where there were elephants in any numbers even as far as Burundi where there were none.

Unfortunately, wildlife departments are almost always the weakest and least influential of all government agencies, not only in Africa but internationally. Competition for resources and influence usually leaves wildlife at the bottom of the list of priorities, often paid lip service but little else in terms of resources.

Nevertheless, we have made our own assessment of how each country measures up to the criteria outlined in Conf. 7.9.

## ZIMBABWE



### MANAGEMENT

1. Sustainability and risks: corruption, official complicity and under-funding potentially enormous risk.
2. Monitoring ability: minimal. Aerial surveys cover tiny proportion of population.
3. Effectiveness of anti-poaching: reduced with no DNPWM funding.



### ENFORCEMENT

1. Sustainability of legal and illegal kills: spread of poaching and proposed cull unsustainable.
2. Mixing legal and illegal ivory: commonplace.
3. Effective law enforcement: cover-up and failure to act on information.
4. Control of illegal imports/exports: illegal trade routes across all borders. Army smuggling commonplace.

## SOUTH AFRICA



### MANAGEMENT

1. Sustainability and risks: militarisation and instability potentially big risks.
2. Monitoring ability: could be affected by extension of Kruger.
3. Effectiveness of anti-poaching: need to step up to counter upsurge in poaching.



### ENFORCEMENT

1. Sustainability of legal and illegal kills: questionable with potential threats.
2. Mixing legal and illegal ivory: easy.
3. Effective law enforcement: improvements made but more resources needed for regional co-ordination. Undermined by political position on ivory trade.
4. Control of illegal imports/exports: a major smuggling route. Not controlled. Need for enquiry into army smuggling.

## BOTSWANA



### MANAGEMENT

1. Sustainability and risks: re-colonisation of former range in neighbouring countries expected to reduce populations significantly.
2. Monitoring ability: Questionable. Recent survey covered 4% of range. Disagreements over actual numbers.
3. Effectiveness of anti-poaching: Effective under present conditions, but will be undermined by SACIM?



### ENFORCEMENT

1. Sustainability of legal and illegal kills: possibly in short term, depending on extent of emigration.
2. Mixing legal and illegal ivory: easy.
3. Effective law enforcement: very lax at present. Many wildlife laws flouted openly.
4. Control of illegal imports/exports: very weak.



# CONF. 7.9 / DISTRIBUTION MAP

## MALAWI

### MANAGEMENT

1. Sustainability and risks: unsustainable losses occurring now.
2. Monitoring ability: weak.
3. Effectiveness of anti-poaching: needs urgent strengthening.

### ENFORCEMENT

1. Sustainability of legal and illegal kills: totally unsustainable.
2. Mixing legal and illegal ivory: easy - a dealer's dream.
3. Effective law enforcement: relatively high penalties for few who are caught. Military involvement in smuggling.
4. Control of illegal imports/exports: almost nil.


## NAMIBIA

### MANAGEMENT

1. Sustainability and risks: unique desert elephant population down to 34. Etosha population continually at risk from anthrax.
2. Monitoring ability: underfunded, given urgent problems of kaokoveld desert elephants and lack of accurate data on elephant status.
3. Effectiveness of anti-poaching: so far escaped heavy poaching. Sudden upsurge would be catastrophic for such small population (c.5,000).

### ENFORCEMENT

1. Sustainability of legal and illegal kills: desert elephants highly endangered.
2. Mixing legal and illegal ivory: easy.
3. Effective law enforcement: penalties now increased but not always enforced fairly.
4. Control of illegal imports/exports: very lax.



MAP SHOWING ELEPHANT RANGE, MIGRATION MOVEMENTS AND MAIN IVORY SMUGGLING ROUTES IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION.

# MESSAGE TO CITES

## NORBERT MUMBA'S MESSAGE TO CITES

► Norbert Mumba, head of  
Zambian Species Protection  
Department, in an interview with  
EIA, November 1991.



In January 1992, the new government in Zambia withdrew its support for the downlisting proposal to CITES by southern African countries. Norbert Mumba, head of the Zambian Species Protection Department, gave his reaction to the downlisting proposal in an interview with EIA.

**Question:** *What is your opinion of lifting the ban on trade in elephant products?*

*"The time is simply not right now for the simple reason that before the ban is lifted we have to make sure that all the countries that contemplate lifting the ban put, or have (put) into place, mechanisms which will effectively control trade in ivory. Very few of those countries have those mechanisms, including the major route which is South Africa.*

*"I would rather that we in this region and in the world at large pump money into building a system which will help us monitor and investigate effectively cases of illegal dealing in ivory.*

*"What we're fighting against is not, strictly speaking, ivory trading - we're fighting to preserve the elephant, to let it live."*

**Question:** *What is your opinion of the proposed Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing?*

*"Where you create the situation that some ivory is legal, other illegal, it just makes it difficult for law enforcement to detect. I won't be able to know whether a necklace or a bangle or an earring has come out of an illegally obtained tusk or a legally*

*obtained tusk. Legalising the trade simply creates that loophole. We have rushed into SACIM in the sense that we have not even sealed the loopholes of the source of this ivory.*

*Is the centre the ultimate market? The answer is no. They still have to sell the ivory to individuals. It is at this point the loophole comes in. The individual would deliberately go to the centre to buy a few pieces of ivory legally, just to cover himself up, and then he goes on with his illegal purchase spree. The moment you confront him he'll say "Yes I bought this ivory from SACIM and here is my documentation."*

**Question:** *Zimbabwe argues that they need revenue from the sale of ivory and hides for vital conservation work. What do you say to this?*

*"The long term result of conserving the elephant is by far more than what would come by killing it and selling off its ivory. From safari tours you can earn ten times over from one elephant than (you would from) killing it because it will still be there. Another set of tourists come and see it tomorrow."*

*"I think Zimbabwe's view is neither here nor there in as far as they will earn much more on a long term basis by tourists coming to view their elephants than by killing them. The (tourist) trade is so wide you're not only talking in terms of tourists paying to view the elephants but you have the situation where their airline is also earning and their hotels are earning. It's such a long chain, it by far exceeds straight dealing (of ivory)... No doubt about it, elephants are far more valuable alive than dead."*

**Question:** *Do you have a message to CITES?*

*"To the delegates I would say before we make a big mistake that mankind will live forever to regret, we have to be objective...In considering the move from Appendix I to Appendix II, everybody should bear in mind that the population of the African elephant is greatly threatened. Zambia is an example. One hundred thousand elephants in the Luangwa National Park dropping to a level of 20,000 in a period of ten years. If that rate had continued in the next ten, fifteen years, we would be in a situation where it will have been nearly impossible to come across elephant."*

► The Journal of Commerce,  
January 16, 1992

## Ivory Trade Advocates Lose Zambia's Support

WASHINGTON — Zambia withdrew its support for other Southern African countries that seek to re-open international trade in ivory and other elephant parts, according to the U.S. Environmental Investigation Agency.


The Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing countries — which include Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Botswana — want to gain more support for their proposals to place the elephant on Appendix II, allowing for a resumption of international

# ZAMBIA

The new Zambian government made a bold decision in January this year to withdraw its reservation to the Appendix I listing of the African elephant and reconsider its membership of the Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing (SACIM). In stark contrast with neighbouring Zimbabwe, Dr Christon Tembo, the new Minister of Tourism, has acknowledged Zambia's problems with poaching and corruption and is addressing the difficult task of finding positive solutions. Zambia recognises that legalising trade in ivory is not one of them.

In 1975, Zambia boasted well over 100,000 elephant and 8,000 black rhino. The Luangwa Valley was once called "The Last Kingdom of the Elephant", but the international demand for ivory and rhino horn, coupled with Zambia's increasing unemployment, led to many Zambians becoming involved in commercial poaching. Today Zambia's rhino are virtually gone, and many observers fear that the elephant population, which is down to 20-25,000, will suffer a similar fate if ivory trading is legalised in southern Africa.

As a key link in the international ivory trade network for over a decade, Zambia can attest to the monumental task facing enforcement agencies which are up against well-armed poachers, corrupt military officials and wealthy ivory dealers who operate from as far away as Johannesburg and Taiwan. It is against such odds that Zambia's Species Protection Department (SPD) has achieved a number of successes in its fight against the poachers and dealers since its formation in 1990.



## THE EFFECT OF LEGALISING TRADE IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

Zambia's situation proves that the destruction caused by the ivory trade cannot be contained in any one country. Zambian authorities, who are fighting hard to disentangle Zambia from the illicit trade, fear that their efforts will be in vain if other countries legalise international trade in elephant products. Removing the elephant from Appendix I in any one of Zambia's neighbouring countries, such as Zimbabwe, Botswana or South Africa, will jeopardise Zambia's efforts to save its elephants.

The attempt by Zimbabwe and other southern African countries to re-open the trade "will greatly affect us", said Norbert Mumba, head of the SPD. "Everyone wants to assume that we can control poaching, which I don't think is the case here, and to a certain extent it's not the case in Zimbabwe. The simple test is: is there a loophole? If the answer is yes, then it will affect everyone in the region, because it is that loophole which will be exploited." (2).

## ZAMBIA'S PREVIOUS POLICY INFLUENCED BY IVORY LOBBY

EIA has learned that nobody in Zambia's National Parks and Wildlife Service (ZNPWS) involved in managing Zambia's elephant populations was consulted on the proposal for downlisting them to Appendix II (24). Dr. Gilson Kaweche, who was responsible for Zambia's most recent elephant survey, had never seen the downlisting proposal before EIA investigators showed it to him. In fact no Zambian wildlife

officials had any hand in writing it. The proposal was drawn up outside Zambia and negotiations concerning both that and Zambia's membership of SACIM, undertaken by the previous government, were conducted "at the diplomatic level" (1). In other words, Kenneth Kaunda's previous government allowed the ivory lobby led by Zimbabwe to dictate Zambia's wildlife management policy.

### REGIONAL DOWNLISTING PROPOSAL: MISINFORMATION

The regional downlisting proposal before CITES (24), written without consultation with ZNPWS, makes statements about Zambia's elephant populations that are untrue.

1. Zambia's elephant population numbers "37,000".

**Not true.** A recent survey has put the figure at between 20-25,000 (36).

2. "Zambia's population ...appears to have stabilised and is increasing in some areas".

**Distortion.** The population appears to have stabilised in South Luangwa National Park in that it is no longer decreasing, but poaching is still heavy in other areas (see below).

3. "A sustainable use programme [cropping] should be introduced in South Luangwa ...in order to meet the entire running costs of the Park".

**"Disastrous".** This was the reaction of Vernon Bailey, honorary ranger in South Luangwa for 12 years. He told EIA "It is a very young population [which] has just recovered from an enormous onslaught that was horrific when you consider the tens of thousands that were slaughtered in a very short space of time". Besides, an informal estimate puts the proportion of tuskless elephants at 30%, so "what are you going to crop?" asked Bailey. "Are we going to be shooting out the only breeding stock we've got?" (23)

*The attempt by Zimbabwe and other southern African countries to re-open the trade "will greatly affect us"*  
said Norbert Mumba, head of the SPD

# ZAMBIA

## THE IVORY BARONS' SANCTUARY AND CONDUIT

Zambia has become a sanctuary for poachers and an illegal conduit for ivory traders. In 1990 it is estimated that at least 5 tonnes of ivory was illegally flown from Zambia to South Africa and Swaziland (see below). That amount pales by comparison with the quantities believed to be secretly transported by truck through Botswana and Zimbabwe en route to South Africa. The range of perpetrators who are exploiting Zambia to wipe out the region's elephant population is as international as the trade itself. Linking the ivory kingpins to the smugglers is difficult, however, because the former are often protected in their respective countries.

## MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Unlike other southern African countries, Zambia is willing to admit that its poaching problem begins at home with its own military and police. "The involvement of security personnel is very clear," asserts Norbert Mumba, whose Species Protection Department falls under the direction of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) (2). Recognising the difficulty of stopping a trade which enjoys the security services' backing, the ACC has decided to take the war directly to the army and the police. Last March, they held a workshop where firearms and ammunition which had been supplied to poachers by security personnel were openly displayed. Paul Russell of the ACC told his audience that "Corruption is a major motivating force behind the commercial poaching" (3).

Home Affairs Minister, Kingsley Chinkuli, admitted that security personnel were involved in poaching (3). Zambian military and police rifles, including AK-47s, are still being

used by Zambian poachers in Zimbabwe, and have been traced back to several high-ranking Zambian officials (4). Recent para-military sweeps in Zambia have turned up hundreds of such weapons, including reproductions made in local, makeshift gun factories (5).

## THE SMUGGLERS AND THEIR ROUTES

### FOREIGNERS IN CHARGE

Although some Zambian officials and businessmen are involved in trading ivory, it is the non Zambians who are financing the poaching and smuggling. The SPD asserts that "the Zambians do not have a hold on the finance operations. Most of their operations are local, so they sell to foreigners within Zambia...the involvement of Senegalese and foreigners is very obvious" (2). Greeks, Senegalese, South Africans, Zaireans, Italians, North Koreans and others have made Lusaka their base for illicit operations, using hard currency to buy off Zambian officials, poachers and carvers.

### SMUGGLING TO SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAZILAND BY AIR

Roy Temba Yumba was arrested in October 1990 for attempting to smuggle 28 kilos of ivory to Swaziland by plane. The seizure seemed relatively small to Zambian investigators until they discovered that Yumba had been going in and out of Swaziland two to three times a week for some time. On a visit to Swaziland, SPD officials discovered that Zambians and Zaireans were smuggling at least 100 kilos of ivory a week to Swaziland aboard planes from Lusaka. Swazi officials handed over documents which accompanied the ivory pieces and showed them to be "legal". SPD Director Norbert Mumba said that 100 kilos a week "is what we know about" from the false documents, and that "It could be a serious underestimate" (2).

One crate full of ivory and rhino horn, flown from Lusaka to Manzini on 14th October 1990, was described as "curious

*"Corruption is a major motivating force behind the commercial poaching" (3).*

Paul Russell, Director of ACC Operations

▼ Weapons captured from poachers by the SPD, February 1991. /Reeve / EIA





# ZAMBIA

## ZIMBABWE AS HUNTING GROUND

*Zimbabweans living in Hurungwe, Kazangarare, Kariba, Gurive and Kanyemba are known to assist Zambian poachers (19).*

With Zambia's own rhino population wiped out, and their dwindling population of big "tuskers", Zambian poachers look to surrounding countries - mainly Zimbabwe - to feed the demand for illegal ivory and rhino horn. The SPD has collected an abundance of intelligence on the extent of cross-border poaching operations. Their records, as well as the testimony by honorary rangers and National Parks officials, cast serious doubt over Zimbabwe's claims that it has its poaching situation under control. In fact, Zambian poachers seem to be operating more extensively and deeper in Zimbabwe than ever before, apparently receiving support from Zimbabweans (see "Zimbabwean Complicity" below).

Honorary rangers and SPD officials showed EIA six major crossing points for poachers stretching from Tongabezi just west of Livingstone, along Lake Kariba to Chiawa near Chirundu on the Lower Zambesi. Generally operating in gangs of 4 or 5, poachers travel as far as 500 kilometres to reach these points. They pay fishermen to transport them across, often storing their weapons on the Zimbabwe shoreline, and spend as little as 5 days or as much as 6 weeks poaching inside Zimbabwe's National Parks and Game Management Areas (2,14). In many cases, like that of Charles Chigoma, corrupt Zambian officials and businessmen provide the weapons and transport the ivory and rhino horn to the carving factories in Lusaka and Livingstone.

## MILITARY AND POLICE INVOLVED WITH CROSS-BORDER POACHERS


In November 1990 Charles Chigoma, a Zambian businessman, was arrested along with two Zambian police officers, one an inspector, for assisting cross-border poachers. Chigoma, who was from a town on the shore of Lake Kariba called Siavonga, was an ivory "co-ordinator". He supplied several poachers with rifles which he had secured from local security officials, and sent them across Lake Kariba aboard fishing boats in search of elephants and rhino in Zimbabwe. His last operation almost succeeded. The poachers brought back 9 elephant tusks, having found no rhino. The last stage was to transport the ivory to Lusaka for carving and export. Since police were conducting roadblocks between Siavonga and Lusaka, Chigoma paid local policemen to arrange for his safe passage (2,6).

Acting on a tip-off, SPD officials were able to track down Chigoma and his ivory, which they found carved up in a Lusaka compound just 48 hours after it had been delivered from Zimbabwe. The last tusk was being chopped up as they walked in on the carvers (2).

According to honorary rangers involved in anti-poaching operations, poachers who cross the Zambezi River near Livingstone usually travel from Kaomo (north of Kafue National Park), where they secure weapons from corrupt officials at the army barracks (15). Traders drive down from Lusaka to pick up the ivory to take it back to Lusaka for processing (16). Some poachers take their booty directly to Livingstone, where they sell it to the factories (17).

A number of poachers operating near Chiawa on the

▼ The ivory room, ZNPWS headquarters, Chilanga.  
December 1991/Gleizes/EIA





◀ The Mulobezi - Livingstone train. Used to smuggle ivory from Kafue National Park. / Gleizes / EIA

Lower Zambezi receive their weapons from corrupt police officials stationed nearby (18). According to a poacher recently captured in Zimbabwe, a police officer stationed at the Chirundu border-post transports poached ivory and rhino horn to Lusaka using a police vehicle (2). This particular officer has been implicated before by a dead poacher's relatives. He has InterPol status, which allows him to travel back and forth to Zimbabwe on a daily basis. He allegedly exploits this to warn poachers if Zimbabwean patrols are operating (18).

## ZIMBABWEAN COMPLICITY IN CROSS-BORDER POACHING

Zimbabwean officials invariably blame their poaching problems on Zambians and have not publicly raised the question of their own countrymen's involvement. The Harare Herald noted last July, however, that Zimbabweans living in Hurungwe, Kazangarare, Kariba, Guruve and Kanyemba are known to assist Zambian poachers (19).

Zambian poachers have been caught and sometimes killed deep inside Zimbabwe; as far as the southern part of Zimbabwe's Hwange National Park, roughly 200 kilometres from the border. Zambian authorities assert that Hwange is too far for cross-border poachers to walk, "which means someone on the other side is most likely helping" (2). Honorary rangers near Livingstone report that one gang of poachers crosses to Zimbabwe's Victoria Falls National Park where they link up with Zimbabweans who drive them to Hwange (20).

At the request of Zimbabwe National Parks Department (DNPWM), the SPD conducted investigations in the Chiawa area into two Zimbabwean game scouts suspected of connivance in cross-border poaching. Locals in the area recognised photos of the two men (16,18).

## POACHING DOWN IN LUANGWA VALLEY. POACHERS MOVE SOUTH

From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, Zambian poachers concentrated on the North and South Luangwa Valley, home to the majority of Zambia's elephants. Intense anti-poaching efforts in the Valley have slowed the poachers down. In North Luangwa, 13 elephants were reported poached in 1991, compared with about 1,000 in 1990 (2). South Luangwa's Integrated Resource Development Programme (LIRDIP), which aims to integrate rural development with resource conservation, has also enjoyed a measure of success, and the population is no longer declining (21,22). But some observers claim that poachers are less interested in South Luangwa because an estimated 30% of its elephants are tuskless (23). Poachers who used to operate in Luangwa have moved south and travel long distances down to the Zambesi Valley and even into Zimbabwe itself in search of rhino and elephant (2,23).

## MASSACRES IN KAFUE NATIONAL PARK

Kafue National Park, where enforcement has been weaker, is now a focus for poachers. Last year, more than 40 elephants were massacred by one gang in several days in the Kafue area (16,25). In August 1990, the Species Protection Department seized over 200 tusks from the Kalomo area, poached from 100 elephants in Kafue and the Mulobezi/Sechifula Game Management Area (26). Game scouts report that they are constantly confiscating tusks and weapons in the park and the adjacent GMAs. One ADMAD unit of 8 scouts, which has no transport or radios, managed to confiscate more than 50 weapons in 1991 in the Mulobezi/Sechifula GMA alone. They have even seized AK-47s imported from the war in neighbouring Angola (27).

*An estimated 30% of South Luangwa's elephants are tuskless (23)*

# ZAMBIA

*it took the chief warden of the Southern Command 18 months to visit all the camps under his command (31)*

An intensive anti-poaching operation involving ZNPWS, honorary rangers and SPD has been mounted to counter poaching in Kafue during the 1991/92 rainy season. The last big breeding herd in the park, numbering some 500 elephants, has been surrounded by 6 camps which will move with the herd and guard them round-the-clock.

## POACHING IN THE ZAMBEZI VALLEY

Elephants that migrate between Zimbabwe and Zambia are also popular targets for poachers. Considered as one population, elephants from both countries come to the banks of the narrow Zambezi River to drink and forage, sometimes crossing over to the other side for a day or longer. Dr. Gilson Kaweche of ZNPWS recalls finding elephants wearing Zimbabwean radio-collars on Zambian territory. The Zimbabwe DNPWM subsequently rounded them up and drove them back into Zimbabwe (21).

In November 1991, EIA investigators were shown carcasses of poached elephants that had swum from Zimbabwe's Mana Pools National Parks to Zambian islands in the Zambezi (28). Similarly, further up the Zambezi, honorary rangers recounted several incidents where elephants from Victoria Falls National Park swam to Zambian territory, only to be surrounded and shot on arrival (29).

▼ Elephant poached in Zambezi valley, Zambia. November 1991 /Galster/EIA



## ZIMBABWE CULLING "ZAMBIAN" ELEPHANTS

Although Zimbabwe and Zambia have stepped up co-operation on anti-poaching efforts, no such co-operation exists for monitoring and managing elephant migrations between the two countries (30). This is worrying, not only because Zimbabwe is using its population survey to justify massive culling operations, but also because they may cull elephants which migrate in and out of Zambia.

Local people on the Zambian side of the Zambezi valley report that Zimbabwean game rangers act to prevent elephants crossing into Zambia by firing in the air on the banks of the river. Zimbabweans might argue that this is to protect them from Zambian poachers, but does it matter to the elephant if the bullet comes from the rifle of a poacher or a culler? The only difference is that in Zimbabwe the profits go straight into central treasury coffers.

If Zimbabwe could see beyond the banks of the Zambezi, they would allow elephants from Mana Pools and surrounding areas to recolonise the Zambian side of the valley and support a programme for anti-poaching and management involving the local people, such as the ZNPWS ADMADE scheme which has proved successful in other parts of Zambia. Encouragement of such a scheme would also have positive benefits in helping prevent cross-border poaching in Zimbabwe.

## "NAKED" ENFORCEMENT

ZNPWS officials complain that as long as a 'legal' trade exists and anti-poaching teams remain so ill-equipped, the poachers can never be stopped. One example of what they term "naked" enforcement is National Park's Southern Command. This command is responsible for seven large parks and GMAs, but has only one ranger! With only one vehicle at headquarters in Livingstone, and with such a large area to administer, it took the chief warden of the Southern Command 18 months to visit all the camps under his command. What he saw at his camps was depressing: anti-poaching scouts have no radios, usually no transport, and are often low on ammunition for their outdated bolt action rifles (31).

Financial assistance and the retention of Appendix I are the only means of saving the elephant from the same fate as the rhino. In 1987 Caleb Nkonga, a Zambian wildlife warden, made an ominous statement about Zambia's vain efforts to fight the illegal rhino horn trade, a statement which is equally relevant to their attempts to stop elephant poaching today: "Armed only with hunting rifles...they [anti-poaching scouts] are expected to tackle determined and dangerous gangs of professional poachers armed with a range of sophisticated automatic weapons...For all this, the scouts earn a basic US\$30 per month...The rhino population in Zambia is now so low that the poachers operate principally for ivory, and regard rhino horn simply as a welcome but incidental bonus. The odds are still heavily on the side of the poacher and we need to be much more effective in the next few years, or we will be left with literally nothing to save"(32).




## THE ZAMBIAN CARVING INDUSTRY

Because Africa's ivory dealers are using Zambia as a resource and a conduit, a significant carving industry has emerged there, with an abundance of small carving factories in Lusaka and Livingstone. Carving factories in Lusaka are located in two sprawling compounds on the edge of the city - John Laing and Chawama. In 1991, SPD officials conducted over a dozen raids on Chawama alone, seizing carving machines as well as ivory destined for South Africa (12). Carvers have testified that illegal immigrants, mainly Zaireans, Senegalese and Malians, commission them to carve chopped elephant tusks either into blocks or finished products which are then smuggled to South Africa or Zimbabwe (33).


## RAW IVORY IMPORTED FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES FOR CARVING

Poached ivory from other countries, including Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Zaire and Mozambique, as well as from Zimbabwe and Zambia, makes its way to Zambian carving houses. EIA witnessed raids on Lusaka and Livingstone carving houses and the subsequent interrogations of the carvers. At Maramba Compound in Livingstone, SPD officials learned that the carvers process ivory from Kafue




National Park area as well as from Namibia (34). They sell their ivory to dealers from Windhoek, Namibia, including one Anthony Mataka (34). In July 1991, Livingstone police arrested a man with tusks from Namibia which he was taking to Maramba Compound to be carved before smuggling the pieces back to Namibia (35). The carvers from Maramba also named Basil Steyn, a Zimbabwean ivory dealer in Bulawayo, as someone they visited on business (See Zimbabwe Section) (34).

▲ John Lukwesa. Discovered carving ivory paper knives for sale in South Africa. Chawama compound. 16 November 1991 /Reeve/EIA



◀ Wheels of Africa truck drivers alledged to smuggle ivory from Chawama compound in spare tyres (2). /Gleizes/EIA

# ZIMBABWE



## ROLE MODEL OR CORRUPTION, MURDER, AND COVER-UP?

For the last two years, Zimbabwe has relentlessly campaigned throughout the world for a resumption of the international ivory trade, complaining that it has been unfairly punished for the failure in East Africa to control poaching. However, a closer examination of Zimbabwe's case reveals the hypocrisy in this argument and a systematic failure within Zimbabwe to deal with its own considerable poaching problems.

▼ A relentless elephant misinformation campaign has been launched by the Zimbabwe government over the last two years./Currey

Instead of learning from the terrible experiences of African countries to the north, Zimbabwe is suffering a repeat of the classic pattern that follows the ivory and rhino horn trade: institutionalised corruption, murder and cover-up.

The Zimbabwe Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM) has repeatedly ignored reports of poaching and complicity within its own ranks. Poaching is out of control in new areas where staff known to be implicated have been posted.

The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and Police have been poaching in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Illegal trade across the Mozambique border has been ignored and people who have tried to stop it, murdered. The Mozambique government has stated that poached ivory routinely travels illegally from Mozambique through Zimbabwe with ZNA complicity (33,72,79).

Rather than investigate its own ranks, the Zimbabwe government has found it convenient to imply that all the poaching is done by nationals from neighbouring countries - Zambians, Botswana and Renamo soldiers.

In most parts of Africa, the ivory ban has resulted in a reduction in poaching and provided a breathing space for governments to introduce eco-tourism and implement management and enforcement programmes. In Zimbabwe however, the time has been used to disseminate misinformation in a relentless campaign to re-open ivory trade and promote the lethal use of wildlife. Positive aspects of Zimbabwe's conservation experience have the potential to be built on, but the failure to face up to the very real internal problems has undermined their integrity.

The DNPWM is seriously underfunded and staff morale is low. Parks' budgets are exhausted half way through the year, artificial water-holes are drying up because of lack of spares and fuel for pumps, and animals, including elephants, are dying. The chronic lack of cash is because government allocates very little money to the DNPWM despite its high earnings from tourism. If government returned revenue to DNPWM, the grossly underpriced entrance fees and lodgings in parks could easily be reassessed to raise all the money required for conservation.





## THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY (ZNA)

### BUSINESS AS USUAL

Zimbabwean troops deployed in Mozambique are stationed along strategic supply routes and patrol the common border. During their military service, ZNA personnel have engaged in illicit business deals for personal profit. Witnesses interviewed and cases exposed clearly show that there is a regular flow of goods between Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe with the ZNA providing a conduit (1,2,3,5,6,79).

These illicit business affairs involve hard currency (primarily the South African rand) and valuable goods such as ivory, rhino horn, gems, drugs and weapons that have led to unholy alliances between professed enemies.

A South African dossier on trader Ant White states that he is supplied with ivory by a man named Kassim who in turn mainly obtains his supplies from "the Mocambican and Zimbabwean armies...(34)."

### THE MASVINGO POLICE ENQUIRY - THE FINDINGS (4):

Recent findings by the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) at Masvingo provide clear example of a local underground economy built upon an illicit poaching and smuggling operation. Elephants and rhinos have become victims of poverty, war and greed.

### POACHING AS PART OF THE LOCAL ECONOMY.

The southern railway line from Mozambique to Zimbabwe passes through a small border crossing at Sango. The ZNA argued that it was unsafe, on security grounds, for the trains to stop at Sango. Instead they would go straight on to Rutenga, a small railway town about 150 km into Zimbabwe which has no customs or police checks.

Army personnel and railway workers developed a big business in moving ivory, rhino horn, motorbikes, expensive cars, cattle, radios and household products easily concealed on the wagons guarded by soldiers. Rutenga is well served by roads and the goods were distributed throughout the country. Rhino horn, ivory and the expensive cars have never been recovered.

There have been many reports of poachers killed by the


army in the Twiza, Sango, Chikombesi and Chipinda areas in and around Gonarezhou National Park, but only rifles were recovered. The ivory and rhino horn was always missing.

Villagers in Sengwe communal lands were poaching elephant in the Gonarezhou, crossing the border with ivory into Mozambique and making their way across the Limpopo River to South Africa. This was easier than crossing directly into South Africa because of the electrified fence on the Zimbabwe/South Africa border.

The ivory was sold on South African farms for rand. The Sengwe people would then return to their communal lands and buy goods from the army.

Men from the Sengwe and Matibi communal lands worked on South African farms near the border. Many were coerced into poaching in Mozambique and Zimbabwe by the farmers, under threat of exposure to the South African Defence Force (SADF). Others were captured by the SADF and sent on poaching expeditions in return for safe passage to South Africa.

Poachers were given weapons by the SADF and investigators believe that the poaching was part of a planned network of destabilisation in the southeastern region of Zimbabwe.



◀ A regular flow of smuggled goods passes between Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, with the Zimbabwe army providing a conduit. /Visnews

*"Thousands of Zimbabwean soldiers are stationed along the road and railway line from Beira port on the coast. These soldiers are said to poach elephants and other species when the opportunity arises."*

- Mozambique government report.

# ZIMBABWE

## THE VICTIMS

Zimbabwe has suffered a turbulent and violent independence. The disappearance of about 5,000 people in Matabeleland, with individuals being dragged from their homes by ZNA 5th Brigade soldiers between 1983-5 (2), has yet to be addressed by the government. The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) has recently been implicated in murder (8) and the case of Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) Captain Nleya alleges involvement by the ZNA Special Investigations Branch (SIB).

The cover-up of Captain Nleya's murder (12) and other "accidents" and murders completely undermines claims that Zimbabwe can control poaching. Forces involved are so influential that senior personnel have died in attempts to uncover the truth.

## THE CAPTAIN NLEYA CASE



Edwin Nleya was a 35 year old captain in the Zimbabwe National Army 1:2 Infantry Battalion. He had formerly been a commander in ZIPRA, the freedom fighters who fought under rebel leader Joshua Nkomo.

Nleya was responsible for discipline and administration of the company (10) and in 1986 he reported corruption by the ZNA in Mozambique and along the Zimbabwe border, to the Under Secretary in the Defence Ministry (9). This corruption included poaching, smuggling, and cattle rustling. According to a colleague of Nleya, these activities were daily occurrences (11).

In Mozambique in 1988 Captain Nleya discovered that his own company had been sent to poach elephant and rhino (13). He is said to have argued about this and other incidents with his Commanding Officer, who is alleged to have pulled a gun on him (13/9/10/14).

On leave in his home town of Bulawayo throughout September, October and November 1988, he was followed and watched. Men in government vehicles were seen watching his house and he recorded details in his diary.

Many recorded incidents occurred before he returned to barracks on 27th December. On 31st December he reported to

Spent the day  
hope for Hwange  
people discussing  
to kill me in near

17 MONDAY Spent the day  
at home. Susca Min  
444 442 442 E with  
3 armed occupants. It  
was the 100th force  
firing at the gate last  
night along Hwange Rd

the Hwange police station that he was being threatened (15). On 2nd January 1989 he spoke with his wife on the telephone and asked her to keep in constant touch.

A note received by Mrs Nleya on 4th January 1989 in her husband's handwriting alleged that he had been "collected by SIB and CIO members...Foul play is expected...(18)."

On 12th March 1989 his decomposed body was found under a tree on a hill behind Hwange Barracks. His clothes were folded next to the body with his ZNA identity card in the pocket of his trousers. A rope was hanging over a branch above his remains (17/19).

On 13th March 1989 CIO officers came to Mercy Nleya's house and threatened to arrest the Captain's brothers (16).

On 14th March 1989 Mercy Nleya was informed that her husband's body had been found (16). The ZNA stated that the death appeared to be suicide (20).

In December 1989 a magistrate's inquest, which had been called for by Nleya's family, found that he had been murdered.

Zimbabwe's 'free' press became interested in the death of Captain Nleya. Zimbabwe's Parade Magazine reported in September 1990 that Mercy Nleya had received "frightening, anonymous telephone calls." Unknown people had also visited the school where she teaches and asked questions about her (9,21).

Despite a police enquiry set up in November 1990 and considerable evidence, there have been no public findings.



► Extracts from Capt Nleya's personal diary. /Currey/EIA

► ZNA Capt Nleya tried to expose poaching and other illegal activities by the army and was murdered in 1989

► Capt Nleya's widow Mercy received a phone call from her husband "he said it would be the last time I was hearing from him and indeed it was the last". "I want justice. With a little pressure from the international world I would think it would help...the government seems to be brushing it aside." /Currey/EIA

## SHEPHARD CHISANGO

Zimbabwe army officer Lieutenant Chisango was posted to Forbes Border post at Mutare on the Zimbabwe/Mozambique border. He was in charge of military customs. On 28th April 1991 he claimed to have refused entry to an army vehicle which arrived after hours (23/24). It is reported (25) that he was preventing the smuggling of goods by soldiers from Mozambique. His angry subordinates manhandled him to Mutare Police station, where he was detained and accused of threatening to shoot military personnel at the border. The charges were later dropped. He was transferred to Harare where he made a statement to his lawyer on 10th May 1991 (26).

On 7th June he telephoned his wife and said he was being detained in army prison cells and asked for some clothes.

## Nleya's enquiry

### 3 suspects die mysteriously

THREE men suspected of involvement in the death of Zimbabwe army Captain Edwin Nleya died recently in mysterious circumstances, according to highly placed sources in Hwange.

Captain Nleya, a former Zapu cadre, was killed in January 1989 after he had threatened to expose what he termed "a scandal among some army officers while on military assignment in neighbouring

alleged deaths of the three men or whether they were connected with the killing of Captain Nleya. "People die every day here and I don't know which ones are connected with the death of

## ZIMBABWE SMUGGLERS KILL ANOTHER OFFICER

SMUGGLING ivory, gold and ordinary goods has now become big business in Zimbabwe protected by powerful and sinister interests, linked to the army. The story behind the death of another Zimbabwe army officer (after Captain Nleya in 1989) shows how serious the situation is becoming.

The latest officer to die was found dead in an army cell in Harare after he had tried to carry out his duty and prevent soldiers from smuggling goods from Mozambique.

According to his family Lt Shepard Chisango was manning the customs post at the eastern border town of Mutare when an army lorry arrived carrying smug-

and threw him off a moving vehicle, leaving him for dead. He recovered and tried to get to Harare police station to report what had happened but his pursuers caught up with him and took him to an army camp where he was thrown into prison pending charges. He was later found dead in an army cell.

A private doctor did a post mortem and found chloroquine in his liver. His family is convinced that he was forced to take an overdose or was injected with chloroquine.

The parallels between Chisango's case and that of Captain Nleya are striking. Nleya died in mysterious circumstances after

She visited him at 2pm on 9th June. His arm was in a sling and he was bruised. He was unable to talk freely because of the presence of a soldier, but he told her he had fallen from a vehicle. She had the impression that he was frightened (26).

He died later that day.

The army post mortem indicated that he had died from chloroquine poisoning (a common anti-malarial drug). However, a second post mortem carried out for the family by a senior government pathologist found: both knees bruised, 1cm x 1cm bruises on his left wrist, 1cm x 1cm bruises on his left elbow, 3cm x 2cm bruises on his right cheek, among other injuries. Death may have been caused by "shock possibly due to fractured zygomatic arch", a fractured cheekbone. Only small amounts of chloroquine were found (26).

A police investigation is expected to report soon.

▲ New African magazine, November 1991.

◀ Sunday Times (South Africa), November 17, 1991.

## OTHER SUSPICIOUS DEATHS

- ◆ **September 1987:** two National Parks investigators, Martin Sibanda and Martin Marimo, are shot dead in an ambush. They are investigating the movement of ivory from Gonarezhou. They are accompanied by game scout Simbini who is abducted in the raid and has never been seen since (see "Gonarezhou N.P. and its deadly legacy"). **DIES - AMBUSH**
  - ◆ **1988:** a Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) officer is a member of a five man team investigating illegal ivory poaching and trade. **DIES - CAR ACCIDENT (28).**
  - ◆ **1989:** a CIO officer is a member of a four man team investigating illegal ivory poaching and trade. **DIES - CAR ACCIDENT (28).**
  - ◆ **30th June 1990:** Police Superintendent John Chamba visits Hwange police station, allegedly to retrieve confiscated rhino horn and ivory (29,30). He drives towards Victoria Falls and hits a stationary trailer at the 435 km peg on route A8. The Police Commissioner flies to Victoria Falls and back to Harare the next day (29/30). Allegations are made that he has "come to collect some rhino horns...has secured a buyer in Harare (29)." **DIES - CAR ACCIDENT. IVORY AND RHINO HORN NEVER RECOVERED.**
- A Sunday Times article (31) suggests other deaths related to the Nleya murder occurred in mysterious circumstances. EIA investigators discover that two of the men were acquaintances of Capt Nleya and held senior ranks in the Police and the CIO:
- ◆ John Chitsa, deputy superintendent commanding officer for Matabeleland North and a friend of Nleya's (32), is present when Nleya complains about senior officers' corruption (32). Dies just before Capt Nleya on 23/9/88 at 310 km peg on route A8 (29). **DIES - CAR ACCIDENT.**
  - ◆ Terence Mudewe, a major in the CIO and a friend of Nleya and John Chitsa (32), stops his car at the 286 km peg on route A8 to help a man lying in the road, apparently drunk. Mudewe is then run over by a truck. This is only 17 days after Nleya's body is found (32/29). **DIES-CAR ACCIDENT.**

# ZIMBABWE

## THE GONAREZHOU NATIONAL PARK AND ITS DEADLY LEGACY

▼ Gonarezhou is still closed to foreign tourists after heavy poaching in which the Army and National Parks staff were implicated. /Currey/EIA



In 1987 the Gonarezhou National Park in the south-east lowveld was closed due to heavy poaching of elephants and rhino. Even today, foreign tourists are still not allowed into the Park. Over the last six years concerned Zimbabwean conservationists have sent three separate reports on the situation to government ministers (53,54,55). They have implicated National Parks staff, army personnel, SADF contacts and ivory smugglers in the poaching operations. The reports have been consistently ignored and certain suspects have even been posted to areas of highest rhino and elephant density. Only now is there an internal enquiry forced upon the DNPWM in return for support by local non governmental organisations at the 8th COP of CITES.

In September 1987 a National Parks investigation team was ambushed in the Gonarezhou while in pursuit of poachers (53,54,55,56). The team were in constant radio contact and they were the only ones attacked on a road frequented just before and after the ambush. Two investigators were shot dead and a scout was abducted. The attack was officially blamed on Renamo and the park was declared a "frozen zone" for command by the army (55). The freezing of National Parks to afford military personnel the opportunity to poach was a strategy deployed during the Rhodesian war.

Government reports refer to 823 elephant carcasses found during this era (76). The massive poaching depended upon well-placed wildlife officials as well as army and police patrols operating under the pretence of defending the territory against Renamo forces. Poaching operations became so visible that park officials were ordered to be silent and local residents threatened in an effort to protect the longevity of the operation. Elephant carcasses were found next to roads in areas where Renamo would be unlikely to have access with such an intensive ZNA presence.

Poaching in the Gonarezhou is said to have declined although EIA investigators visiting the park in November 1991 learned of five elephants poached a few days before and three of the last remaining rhino killed a few months earlier (55).

### THE THREE PROFITEERS

Three central characters are alleged in reports to have been implicated, alongside the ZNA, in poaching activities (53,54,55,56,57). They are Enoch Mkwebu, former warden of Gonarezhou, game scout Zephania Makatiwa, and Bill Taylor, a dentist. The two DNPWM officers are currently under investigation, having been posted near the highest concentrations of elephant and rhino. Bill Taylor is reported to be still actively smuggling (53,54,55).

Bill Taylor, an American, was schooled in South Africa where he came into contact with former Rhodesian and SADF soldiers before moving to Zimbabwe as a dentist. Allegations surround his involvement with Mkwebu and Makatiwa, and the three of them were seen on a number of occasions in the vicinity where carcasses were later found (53,54,55,56,57). Allegations have been made that the three men killed Gonarezhou's famous elephant Kabakwe, an old radio-collared bull with tusks over 50kg each. Taylor is reported to have been offering such tusks in South Africa soon after Kabakwe's killing (55,56).

► New government statistics omit the 823 elephants poached in Gonarezhou despite surveys published at the time.

OPERATION STRONGHOLD STATISTICS: JULY 1986 TO SEPTEMBER 1991														
	RHINO KILLED	REPTILES KILLED	POACHERS KILLED	POACHERS CAPTURED	POACHERS FINED	CONFLICTS	NO. OF INCIDENTS	NO OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES	WILDLIFE RESOURCES	WILDLIFE RESOURCES	WILDLIFE RESOURCES	WILDLIFE RESOURCES	WILDLIFE RESOURCES	WILDLIFE RESOURCES
ZAMBEZI VALLEY	631	152	84	35		125	500	62	8000	129	50	1	3	
MATUSADONA	60	8	4	7		114	30	4	750	31	4			
CHEYE	72	5	15	6	30	13	23	7	634	22	5			
CHIZARIRA	60	8	13	4	41	15		7	283	56	8			
CHIRISA	24	1	2		22	6	35	1		6	8	1		
SENGWA	21					2	11							
HWANGE	72	34	17			35	54	11	783	41	18			
GONAREZHOU	14	50	10			14	131	15	481	4	53	2	3*	
TOTAL	954	258	145	63	202	221	784	107	10831	289	148	4	6	

Table 3a. Carcass 3 samples

and estimates Gonarezhou

Strat	No. Counted	No. Estimated
1a	2	17
1b	3	26
2	16	139
3	7	62
4	18	155
5	11	95
6	8	113
7	28	236
TOTAL	93	823



dramatically declined. Police have reported that "it is no longer ordinary poaching, but some kind of military operation (63)."

Local witnesses have seen ZNA poaching for rations from their base near the National Park. At Police headquarters in Harare suspicions of complicity by local enforcement agencies, especially DNPWM, have been discussed. According to a Police source (75), there seems to be no other explanation as to how such small gangs which do not know the area can so easily find their prey as well as slip in and out unnoticed.

Despite poaching being clearly out of control, as in Gonarezhou at the height of poaching activity, a cull took place in September 1991 in the Sengwa Research/Chizarira area. About 250 elephants were killed in the only "official" cull in Zimbabwe in recent years. Ad hoc bulls were the prime target in an area where one safari operator complained there was tree overgrowth, due to depletion of elephants by previous culls, making it difficult for his clients to see wildlife just a few yards away (60). Despite the cull being purported to be for ecological reasons, sources saw a directive from the Director of DNPWM to make sure all trophies were of good quality (60,81,82).


Conservationists fear that renewed ivory trading will institutionalise this type of cull, based on commercial considerations rather than management principles.

## RHINO AND ELEPHANTS - THE POACHING SPREADS

As rhino numbers decline and they become harder to locate, poachers increasingly turn to elephants to subsidise their incursions. According to DNPWM Chief Investigator Graham Nott, poachers "are taking an increasing interest in ivory ... criminal elements coordinating poaching gangs are instructing their operatives to poach elephant as well as rhino (59)."

Poaching has increased in Matabeleland North and the Zambezi Valley (62). Press reports refer to poaching gangs operating in Hwange, Matetsi, Chewore, Matusadona, Mana Pools, Chete, Charisa, and Chizarira. In Matabeleland North a US Department of Defence document states "The recovery of 25 rhino horns and the admission by one poacher to having killed 18 animals in one week indicates a highly effective poaching operation under way (74)."

Mana Pools is a focus of Zambian cross-border raiding, but recently DNPWM staff have been investigated for complicity (83). The north eastern Zambezi Valley has also been subject to poaching and the ZNA have been known to smuggle rhino horn and ivory along the eastern border with Mozambique. Police have confirmed that the area is ripe for smuggling of poached horn (77).



## MKWEBU MOVES ON

After leaving the Gonarezhou, Enoch Mkwebu was posted as acting Provincial Warden of Gokwe (58). During the 1991 winter season when no crops were even planted, over 50 elephants were shot as "problem animal control" (PAC) within his jurisdiction. Other abuses of PAC to justify killing elephants for ivory and hide have been reported (53,54).

After Gokwe, Mkwebu was posted to Matetsi Safari Area which borders on Hwange National Park. This area is said to have 40% of Zimbabwe's elephant population. Poaching has increased dramatically in this region where, in 1991, elephant and rhino were shot not far from main camp in broad daylight without poachers being apprehended (78). Aerial surveys along the Botswana border have suggested "illegal hunting occurring (79)."

## CHIZARIRA - THE LATEST CASUALTY

A few years ago Chizarira National Park was said to be "the only place remaining on earth where a tourist could be virtually guaranteed of seeing a black rhino in the wild (80)."

The current warden is Zephania Makatiwa.

Reports vary, but over 100 rhinos have been poached in this area alone with about 60 carcasses found since late 1989 (61). A 1991 aerial survey reported a dead-to-live ratio of 5:1 for rhino (68). Sightings of live rhino and tracks have

◀ Bill Taylor, an American, alleged to have been involved in poaching in Gonarezhou.

◀ Enoch Mkwebu is now warden in Matetsi Safari Area which borders Hwange NP and is said to have 40% of Zimbabwe's elephant population. Poaching has increased in this region. /Currey/EIA

▼ Kabakwa, Gonarezhou's famous tusker.



# ZIMBABWE

*Elephant poaching nationally is at much lower levels.*

## A MISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN

There has been a relentless media campaign by the Zimbabwe government and pro-trade interests working to re-open the ivory trade and achieve a downlisting for Zimbabwe's elephants. This has resulted in news articles throughout the world and indignant editorials in Zimbabwe's government-owned newspapers. The arguments used have consistently been based on exaggerated and inaccurate claims.

Why has Zimbabwe focused with such narrow vision on the ivory trade as its conservation saviour? The answer can probably be found in the boardrooms and private ivory stores of Hong Kong, Japan, Johannesburg and Harare, where the few people who will really gain from renewed legal ivory trading reside. Syndicates own hundreds of tonnes of ivory which will dramatically increase in value with renewed international trade.

Zimbabwe's conservation community and government have consistently supported false claims despite their intimate knowledge of the issues. Prone to the quick-fix ideas of pro-trade interests, their philosophy of making wildlife pay (by killing it) has made Zimbabwe the main proponent of the traders' cause. Unfortunately, exposure of their claims inevitably undermines the integrity of the officials, organisations and individuals involved and reveals Zimbabwe's inability to manage its elephants properly.

Some of the main arguments which regularly appear in pro-ivory trade propaganda are as follows:

**Lie 1** *The ivory ban has been responsible for an increase in elephant poaching.*

When the very high poaching levels prior to the ban in Gonarezhou National Park are taken into account, elephant poaching nationally is at much lower levels. However, an increase has been occurring in some areas, especially where National Parks personnel who were already under suspicion of complicity in poaching have been transferred from Gonarezhou.

**Lie 2** *The ivory ban has been responsible for soaring ivory prices.*

Throughout the world ivory prices have decreased, and collapsed throughout most of Africa. It is only in southern Africa where speculation on future legal ivory sales exists that ivory has maintained a value. In Zimbabwe, current prices are lower than pre-ban prices (36).

**Lie 3** *Money from humane culling of elephants - the sale of ivory, hide and meat - is vital for Zimbabwe's conservation efforts.*

Hide and ivory sales revenue has always gone straight into the government's Central Treasury and never been allocated to conservation (39). Meat is sold, not given away, often to crocodile farmers and local consumers.

Zimbabwe currently lacks the capacity to cull its elephants humanely. The government admitted that its operation in September 1991 was a failure. Crocodile farmers were called in to do the shooting after DNPWM staff failed to provide the expertise.

**Lie 4** *Zimbabwe has effective management and controls.*

Zimbabwe has consistently failed to confront government

corruption in the National Parks, Police and Army. The replacement of good enforcement officers by staff known to be suspected of poaching in wildlife strongholds suggests government complicity at high levels.

National Parks staff admit that they are under-resourced and under-funded (38,40,41,42). Budget allocations are about half what they require, leaving no money for day to day administration in the second half of the year. There is no additional budget for anti-poaching. In October 1991 Hwange National Park's artificial water-holes started to dry up because the water pumps were breaking down for lack of fuel or spare parts. Some animals died before private sources provided additional funds (43,44). "The official in the DNPWM said there was nothing his department could do as it did not receive enough money from central Government" (43).

Morale is also low because of lack of resources, the removal of good officers on flimsy pretexts and the transferral of some corrupt staff members into sensitive positions. A US Department of State report noted that "One DNPWM problem is retaining staff (71)." DNPWM is experiencing a lack of internal co-operation and rifts in professional relationships. Most of the senior staff have been under investigation for criminal activities.

## Water woes caused by idle pumps

**Chronicle Reporter**  
**THE water shortage affecting the animals**

ers in the Hwange area early this week expressed concern at the water situation in the park. They

**Lie 5** *Zimbabwe needs the money from ivory sales to help run National Parks.*

Tourism is a far more valuable resource and is being completely undervalued.

Zimbabwe is currently experiencing a tourist boom and revenue to run Parks could be increased enormously if realistic charges were made for park entrance fees and accommodation. Of course this would apply only if Central Treasury then allocated this money back to Parks, which it currently fails to do (45).

The budget allocated to DNPWM in Matabeleland North was less than 1% of tourist revenue from Hwange and Victoria Falls alone in 1990 (45). National Parks are completely undervaluing their own resource. For instance, over 200,000 tourists visit the Rain Forest National park at Victoria Falls each year (45). Many of them are paying US\$190/night for a double room (46) at the Victoria Falls Hotel having spent thousands of dollars to get there. DNPWM charges them US\$1 for entry to the National Park. Overnight fees in Hwange for a three bedroomed chalet are US\$13 (47).

In "Tourism in Matabeleland North (1991)", the author (45) states "Another reason why prices should be increased is the chronic state of underfunding in Matabeleland North. The area's budget has contracted considerably in real terms since 1987, while numbers of tourists and therefore revenues have sharply risen over the same period".

► The Chronicle,  
November 25, 1991

*Hide and ivory sales revenue has always gone straight into the government's Central Treasury and never been allocated to conservation*



# ZIMBABWE

**Lie 6** *Without commercial trade in their products, elephants have no value.*

Tourism is by far the greatest economic return that wildlife gives to the country. According to Zimbabwe's proposal for downlisting the species at CITES "The direct harvest of elephants for their products is generally the lowest valued use for the species (48)".

In local communities, where much of the public debate over wildlife paying for itself revolves, ivory and hides from culled elephants have never been sold internationally to the benefit of local people.

**Lie 7** *Vegetation damage is so severe that half Zimbabwe's elephants have to be culled.*



The main stronghold of Zimbabwe's elephants (40%), Hwange National Park, is not the battleground "smashed and flattened as if by modern artillery (37)". In fact, in a new vegetation study, first impressions are that few trees are damaged (38) - see "Elephant Management".

**Lie 8** *'Campfire' communal wildlife projects will fail because of the CITES Appendix 1 listing of African elephants.*

Communal wildlife projects have never relied on international sale of ivory or hide. Most Campfire projects make their income from sport hunting. The CITES Appendix 1 listing exempts sport hunting.

The idea of selling raw materials from elephants on international markets is contrary to the philosophy of communal wildlife projects, which is to build up local employment and skills based on wildlife. Local utilisation would be more in line with this philosophy.

'Campfire' type communal wildlife projects have been held up as the solution for future conservation schemes where wildlife is not just protected in National Park "exclusion zones" but is valued by local people. Community level conservation is essential for maintaining ecosystems and biodiversity. 'Campfire' and similar schemes should be encouraged. However, some are already suffering from immense problems involving revenue not being returned to

local communities and corruption at District Council level.

According to a SADCC appraisal of 'Campfire', there is still a danger that Councils will tend to retain a greater percentage of funds for development projects instead of releasing such funds to the producer communities (50).

It further undermines Campfire to use its schemes at the forefront of a campaign to re-open the international ivory trade. Such trade has little relevance to the long-term success of Campfire and yet the Campfire Association was set up specifically "when the CITES elephant products ban was first mooted" (49).

CITES Appendix 1 listing permits the internal sale of elephant products as well as sport hunting. George Pangetti, Deputy Director DNPWM stated (52) "The major source of revenue from wildlife utilisation in communal lands is safari

*"The direct harvest of elephants for their products is generally the lowest valued use for the species (48)."*

◀ Hwange National Park is not the battleground "smashed and flattened as if by modern artillery (37)". In fact a new survey suggests that few trees are damaged (38). /Currey/EIA

hunting. It involves a low offtake of trophy animals from the wildlife population with greater financial returns per animal taken...It is hoped that once the District Councils have accumulated some surplus funds they can then develop the potential that exists for passive utilisation".

▼ Income from Campfire projects, which help run schools like this one, have never received money from the international sale of ivory. /Currey/EIA



# ZIMBABWE

## ILLICIT TRADE

▼ Ivory is still sold to foreign tourists in Zimbabwe./Gleizes/EIA



The ivory ban in 1989 did not prohibit the sale of ivory within a country's borders. Zimbabwe has continued to sell ivory internally from the Government ivory store to local traders.

There are reports of ivory stores that have "gone missing" and "lax regulation of the legal trade" (53,54). One major trader is said to be able to "legalise" poached ivory easily with CITES permits (55), and Zimbabwe has been issuing CITES permits to brokers from non-CITES countries since the Appendix 1 listing (70).

Considerable quantities of ivory were sold from the government ivory store to Zimbabwe traders prior to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference in October 1991 (64). This was to stock up for the delegations and their entourage. Although it was not illegal to sell the ivory to these foreign visitors, in most cases the act of taking this ivory home would have been breaking the law of their own country. Huge sales were made.

A senior enforcement officer explained that, while control of this ivory is supposed to be strict, it is easily circumvented. Either the identifying marks on tusks are chipped away or local carvers quickly convert raw tusks, obtained illegally, into legally marketable pieces (84).

One of the main ivory dealers in Zimbabwe is Basil Steyn of Sondela exports. Steyn has recently been the largest purchaser of raw ivory from government stores (85). Steyn told witnesses that he could easily legalise poached ivory with CITES permits as soon as he received it. Steyn also told an EIA investigator that he could illegally export "two to eight tonnes" of raw ivory per month (86). DNPWM staff, as well as a South African dossier, confirm that Steyn is involved in smuggling ivory and rhino horn (35). Steyn has been alleged to smuggle ivory through Bophuthatswana, through farms on the South Africa border, through the South African border post of Beitbridge and the Botswana border post at Plumtree.

Steyn introduced EIA investigators to his driver, Frank, who admitted that he could move illegal ivory: "I can do all loads, any size, as fast as you need ...connections at the border, that is no problem...there are all kinds of back roads, dirt roads..." Another big illicit trader operating out of Francistown is Hans Beck, who is alleged to have smuggling contacts in Zimbabwe as well as South Africa, where he is currently wanted on outstanding charges (87). Although attempts have been made by enforcement agents to nab Beck in Zimbabwe, he has managed to avoid arrest.

At the centre of the Zimbabwean ivory and rhino horn smuggling underworld is American-born Bill Taylor, according to witnesses and dossiers implicating him (see Gonarezhou). Taylor's smuggling activities have also taken him as far as Zaire and Angola (88). Taylor has been named as a go-between for Renamo and South African contacts (89). Witnesses also state that Taylor has high level political cover in Zimbabwe.

Another major trader who has been granted political cover is James Anthony 'Ant' White. White is alleged to be responsible for one of the poaching operations in the Gonarezhou (90). Despite this acknowledgement, and his past history as an assassin, Ant White was recently permitted residency in Zimbabwe, after years of exile. A confidential South African report details his normal smuggling route (34). After collecting ivory in Mozambique, White uses trucks which pass through Mutare and Masvingo in Zimbabwe, and over the border at Beitbridge into South Africa for further transshipment.

There are also said to be considerable movements of ivory from the northern Zimbabwe/Mozambique border to northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania (69). It is then flown from private air strips to the Seychelles, Comoros and other small islands before being shipped on to Singapore and the Middle East (mainly Saudi Arabia). The pilots and accomplices gain access to these areas by posing as rich tourists, businessmen and big game hunters.

## ELEPHANT MANAGEMENT

Half of Zimbabwe's current population of elephants, claimed to be 70,000 animals, will be killed over the next decade, including large numbers of animals migrating in from adjacent countries. Zimbabwe's plans will directly increase existing threats to highly endangered populations in Angola, Zambia and Mozambique.

Zimbabwe's elephant population is concentrated around its borders and is constantly crossing international borders. Elephants move in and out of Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, Namibia and Angola.

Despite serious uncertainties about population levels and cross border migrations, Zimbabwe has not consulted neighbouring countries over its plans to shoot 5,000 elephants a year, including animals shared by Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana. In light of the total lack of regional law enforcement agreements, it is clear that Zimbabwe's actions will put elephants throughout the region at risk.

Although immigration of elephants is acknowledged by Zimbabwe, the significance of immigration for population estimates and projections is ignored in the country's management plans.

Zimbabwe's culling plans are based on exaggerated accounts of the effects of elephants on vegetation and have been used as another ploy to build international pressure to reopen the ivory trade.

## POPULATION ESTIMATES

Every year since 1987, Zimbabwe has claimed substantial upward revisions of its estimated elephant population, far in excess of biologically possible increase.

Estimates produced by Zimbabwe in recent years are:

1987	42,960	(3)
1989	52,000	(2)
1990	60,000	(4)
1991	66,439	(5)
1991	70,000	(6)

These claims are in doubt for several reasons:

a) Zimbabwe has not allowed its population census data to be reviewed by independent scientists, nor has it published such data.

b) Non resident animals migrating into Zimbabwe from Botswana, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique are counted as resident animals.

c) Annual increases in the elephant population are based on unproved assumptions and ignore the impact of environmental factors on annual increases, such as the effects of drought on reproductive levels or calf mortality.

*Every year since 1987, Zimbabwe has claimed substantial upward revisions of its estimated elephant population, far in excess of biologically possible increase.*

▼ Small calf greives over its mother just killed in a cull / I. Douglas-Hamilton (13)



# ZIMBABWE

## IMMIGRATION

In 1989 The Ivory Trade Review Group pointed out that:

"Zimbabwe has reported a national elephant population increase of 9.7% per annum" (between 1987 and 1989). "Because these rates are significantly higher than intrinsic rates of increase for the African elephant, they are attributed primarily to immigration" (7).

Zimbabwe is now claiming that there are more than 30,000 elephants in the Hwange/Matetsi complex, almost twice the number two years ago (9).

"Similarly, the Zambezi Valley and Gonarezhou populations are potentially open to cross border migration and have been for at least part of this century" (11).

"The elephant population in Hwange National Park was reduced from an estimated 20,000 in 1982 to 13,000 in 1986. Thereafter culling ceased.... However this population has rapidly increased to 19,000 [1989], mostly through immigration from Botswana" (8).

## INFANT MORTALITY

Infant mortality is a key area which could affect the estimate of a 5% annual increase in population.

"It only requires about 45% calf mortality to reduce a 5% rate of population increase to 2% and there is no direct evidence of the absence of calf mortality" (11).

In South Africa, during times of drought, "The calf crop fluctuates according to rainfall and estimates vary from 1.99% to 9.13% per annum. In poor rainfall years the conception rate is low and the proportion of non pregnant cows in the population increases".

On the question of age at maturity, Botswana DWNP's Colin Craig states: "Age determination depends on the stage of dental wear and development. It would appear.. that maturity in elephant females in Zimbabwe occurs as the 3rd molar is lost. Laws gives this age as 14 years, but observations on known age elephants (Lang 1980) give 9-10 years for this stage of dental development. **Such a discrepancy would affect a calculation of rate of population increase markedly**" (11).

## ARTIFICIAL WATER POINTS- ATTRACTING MORE ELEPHANTS

The installation of dozens of artificial water points in Hwange Park and the Matetsi complex attracts elephants from Botswana (8), which itself hosts immigrant animals from

Angola, Zambia and Namibia (1). The artificial water points are situated close to the major roads to ensure easy access to elephants for tourists.

By 1980, elephants in Hwange and Matetsi had become dependent during the dry season on some 70 permanent water points installed by the DNPWM. This had increased elephant range during the peak of the dry season from around 35% to 75% of the park.

The resulting high density of elephants around the waterpoints increases the local effect on vegetation and this is used as 'proof' of over-population across the entire range. However, the link between artificial water points, their role in encouraging immigration of elephants from Botswana and the localised impact on vegetation around the waterholes is generally ignored.

Claims of rapid increases in elephant numbers have not been backed by direct evidence. Further unsubstantiated claims concerning the age at which female elephants reach sexual maturity are also used as a basis for Zimbabwe's estimates (10).

## SAVE VEGETATION, KILL ELEPHANTS?

### LACK OF VEGETATION DATA

The proposed killing of thousands of elephants for the sake of vegetation is not justified on the available scientific evidence.

- ◆ As the DNPWM itself admits, "Predicting the outcome of management strategies usually involves modelling the dynamics of important woodland tree species. This requires data on seed production and germination, seedling establishment, growth rates, recruitment, mortality rates of different age/size classes of plants, causes of mortality, effects of elephants and other large mammalian herbivores, fire, frost and rainfall, net growth rates, and age determination techniques for mature trees. Also some tree species regenerate from root stocks, as well as seedlings" (2).
- ◆ "Most of these data are lacking for Zimbabwean trees, with past vegetation studies having been of short duration relative to the life span of the tree" (2).

*"The population increase in Hwange and Matetsi, despite culling, can be attributed to immigration from Botswana" (2).*

*"The indirect evidence for population increase is unsatisfactory in not being able to give an accurate estimate at present" (11).*


► Hwange National Park  
/Gleizes/EIA



- ◆ "It would be simplistic to say that we will know that elephant densities are low enough when we can see canopy woodlands around us in the National Parks. The problem is that there are significant time lags in the rate at which woodlands can be restored" (2).
- ◆ "Even if we reduced elephant numbers overnight to the theoretically calculated densities (which would be impossible) we would be left with the uncertainty that this might not eventually lead to the return of canopy woodlands, or alternatively, that we might not have needed to kill so many elephants" (2).

## AFTER CULLING - NO CHANGE ?

- ◆ "We have information on rates of tree loss at high elephant densities in Chizarira, Gonarezhou, Hwange, Sengwa, Matusadona, and Mana Pools, **but we have very little data on tree loss after population reduction**" (2).
- ◆ "It is noted that many elephant culls only took place after extensive woodland losses had already occurred" (2).
- ◆ "Most of the culls in *Brachystegia* woodland took place after the majority of canopy trees had been removed. In



## ALTERNATIVE CAUSES OF VEGETATION EFFECTS

Elephants are only one factor in vegetation change. Other factors, most commonly fire but also other large mammal species, are often implicated.

The DNPWM states:

- ◆ "Evidence that elephants alone were responsible for the losses are lacking, however, **and the possibility that the losses resulted from interactions between elephants and other ecological factors, eg fire and drought, cannot be ignored**" (2).
- ◆ "In *Brachystegia* woodlands, which were extensively modified by elephants, fire is now a major factor preventing recruitment to the tree layer: recruitment is most unlikely to occur unless the patchwork early burning policy is properly implemented annually, **regardless of the density of elephants utilizing the area**" (2).
- ◆ "Nowhere in the Estate has an effective fire policy been maintained for long enough to reach significant conclusions on whether canopy woodland will return." (2).

Matusadona, aerial photographs of the highlands show that tree cover continued to decline despite culling 311 elephants" (2).

- ◆ "As the Valley experienced a severe drought in the pre-cull years followed by good rains, the decline in damage may have been due to a change in elephant feeding behaviour rather than to a reduction in elephant densities. In the Hwange National Park, rates of tree loss at high densities are known, but losses have not been reassessed since a recent major cull" (2).

## FINALLY, IT'S AESTHETIC

The only persuasive 'ecological' explanation for Zimbabwe's desire to cull elephants is that, like South Africa, Zimbabwe is concerned to preserve the superficial appearance of the parks for tourists.


Zimbabwe's plans to kill 15,000 elephants over the next three years and to continue destroying 5,000 annually for up to 14 years (12) cannot be justified by the criterion of aesthetic choice.


Furthermore, ecologists dispute the need for culling in Hwange National Park. Most of Hwange is Kalahari sand with teak trees, which elephants do not browse. Two-thirds of the biomass is beneath the soil and is not affected by elephant feeding (9). Only in the north of the park is there some vegetation change around waterholes, but even here the basalt soil is thought to be mainly compacted by other species and only aggravated by elephants (9).

▲ Tourism is by far the greatest economic return that wildlife gives to the country / Gleizes / EIA

*"To a large extent, the matter of elephant culling finally falls under the heading of an aesthetic decision" (2).*

# MOZAMBIQUE: THE LEGACY OF WAR





Planned cross-border conservation area under South African control

Foreign military presence

Renamo Head Quarters

Base of 5 Recce (Special Forces) which "runs" Renamo

Mobile Renamo units in South Africa

South African military bases helping Renamo

Air bases used by South Africa in support for Renamo

Railway lines guarded by foreign troops

Eskom power line

Elephant distribution 1974


Areas of high density 1974

Elephant distribution 1990

Ivory movements out of Mozambique

Incursions of poachers into Mozambique

# SOUTH AFRICA



South African Defence Force (SADF) has trucked or flown ivory out of the two countries in vast quantities, Defence Force officers still attempt to cover up the truth.

A peace settlement has been reached in Angola but the war still rages in Mozambique. Renamo was the brainchild of former Rhodesian intelligence. When Zimbabwe became independent, South Africa stepped in to shape Renamo into a highly destructive force, a force which has destroyed many of Mozambique's elephants. Despite a 1984 peace agreement between South Africa and the Mozambique government, evidence has emerged of continuing support for Renamo, to the embarrassment of President De Klerk's government. Supplies are still going in, elephants are still being poached and ivory is still moving out.

Tactics of destabilisation used against Angola and Mozambique are now being turned on South Africa itself. Unhappy with the move towards a majority black government, members of the security forces and the establishment are believed to have developed a sinister "Third Force" - a government within a government. This "Third Force", which involves the SADF and the police, is responsible for violence and atrocities in the black townships, designed to undermine negotiations with the African National Congress (ANC).

What relevance does this have to elephants? The answer is "Kruger National Park". Dr. Robbie Robinson, the head of National Parks in South Africa, in a statement opposing South Africa's attempt to open up the ivory trade, said the whole issue "revolves around the Kruger Park" (1). Kruger is held up as an example of conservation to the rest of Africa. But there is a side to Kruger few people know about. A side which makes it a focus for the military, Renamo and even, some believe, activities of the "Third Force". This could have a far-reaching impact, not only on Mozambique's remaining elephants, but those of Kruger itself.

## IVORY AND THE POLITICS OF DESTABILISATION

The ivory trade in southern Africa is intertwined with South Africa's policy of destabilisation in neighbouring "front line" states. The whole region is awash with weapons which have already destroyed elephants in Angola and Mozambique and are now being turned on South Africa itself.

Over the last two decades, South Africa has waged a bitter and dirty campaign against Angola and Mozambique. Weapons and supplies have been poured in to support the guerilla armies of Unita (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) and Renamo (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana). Meanwhile ivory, rhino horn, timber and gems have flowed out through South Africa to pay for the war effort. Despite the accumulation of evidence that the

## KRUGER PARK: CENTRE OF A HIDDEN STRATEGY BY THE SADF

Kruger National Park runs virtually the length of South Africa's border with Mozambique. Home to 95% of South Africa's elephant population, Kruger and the surrounding area appears to be playing an important role in plans by the South African security establishment to position itself to respond militarily not only in Mozambique but in South Africa should a black majority government come to power.

*"There is a possible problem and there always has been, with the possibility of running into SADF operations. It is a known fact that various SADF operations make use of smugglers and smugglers' routes to channel information from neighbouring states back to the RSA."*

*A second problem exists whereby information may be received of dealers within the ivory and rhino horn trade and upon investigation it is found that these dealers are actually permanent force SADF members.*

*"Another problem which was recognised at the beginning was the activities of South African backed Renamo and Unita which have large-scale rhino horn, ivory and other endangered species smuggling routes in operation.*

*"The last and most spoken about problem, was the possibility of giving South Africa bad international publicity if the media were to take the information and put it across to the world that the South African government is tolerating the smuggling of endangered species and wildlife products as part of the destabilisation process of its neighbouring states."*

*- From a confidential report, dated 21st August 1989, concerning Operation Lock, the ill-fated operation backed by Worldwide Fund for Nature to infiltrate the illegal rhino horn and ivory trade.*

The whole issue "revolves around the Kruger Park"

Robbie Robinson, head of

National Parks,

December 1991



# SOUTH AFRICA

## KRUGER AS A MILITARY BASE

Few people outside South Africa know that Kruger Park is a military base, effectively run by the SADF. Important for weapons storage and transit, it provides an ideal opportunity for the military to hide its covert - and illegal - activities without fear of exposure. Parks staff are not allowed into the military section and after dark military vehicles patrol the roads.

Until recently, Col. Gert Otto of the SADF Special Forces was head of military units in Kruger. He was unpopular with game wardens who claim he ran the place like a military base and enjoyed "carte blanche" in his activities (2).

## RENAMO AND "THIRD FORCE" ACTIVITIES

Kruger has played a key role in training, supplying and equipping Renamo. Around 90% of the border of Kruger is controlled by Renamo on the Mozambique side. Col. Otto was reported to cross regularly into Mozambique to meet senior Renamo officials across the border (2).

Renamo's "logistical nerve centre" has been Phalaborwa, the garrison town on the edge of Kruger which is the home of Five Recce (Fifth Reconnaissance Commando), the South African Special Forces unit which has effectively run Renamo (3). In July 1991, a Mozambican who had been press-ganged into Five Recce, Felix Ndimene, revealed that Phalaborwa is used as a training base and launch pad for massacres and other atrocities within South Africa itself (4).

Renamo deserter, Benedito Filimone, said in 1989 that "currently" more than a hundred Renamo soldiers were being trained somewhere in Kruger (5). In March 1990, it was reported that a Renamo band was operating from the far northern reaches of the park (6).

Kruger and Phalaborwa are among a number of covert bases involved in Renamo and "Third Force" activities in the border area between South Africa and Mozambique. Others are located at Kosi Bay, Ngongwe and Mkuze (8,9,10). Ngongwe has a direct road link with Kruger, along which, Mozambican refugees say, ivory is being moved into South Africa (11).

Renamo also operates mobile bases in the border area to avoid detection. One was discovered within Ndumu Game Reserve which straddles the border with Mozambique (10).

## THE EXTENSION OF KRUGER INTO MOZAMBIQUE

Currently under negotiation is a plan to extend Kruger into Mozambique and create an international park. Under normal circumstances this would be a positive and welcome conservation initiative. But behind the project there appears to be a hidden agenda.

Col. Otto planned to undertake the extension of Kruger. In a confidential document, he set out his plans for a private company called Mozambique Assistance and Investment Corporation (MOZAIC) which would "secure and stabilise the border area between the game park and Mozambique". No Mozambican was proposed for the board of his company. He claimed the money for his project was guaranteed (12).

In an interview in April 1991, Abdul Adamo, Director of Mozambique's Wildlife Department, revealed, not without concern, that the influential South African businessman, Anton Rupert, had offered to fund the park. The World Bank has since stepped in to offer \$12 million for the project, but there is still concern in Mozambique that South Africa will take control of the park - and de facto control over a significant area of the country.

## IMPACT ON ELEPHANTS

Some argue that the military presence in Kruger benefits elephants by deterring poachers. But the implicit danger in the militarisation is that it involves not only the continuing destabilisation of Mozambique but of South Africa itself. Some of the millions of weapons that have accumulated in Mozambique are said to be finding their way into South Africa for a possible military conflict that could ignite a bloody civil war. The central role of Kruger Park would place South Africa's elephants directly in the line of fire.

*"There is evidence that a Renamo band operates from the far northern reaches of Kruger Park"*

*Weekly Mail, March 1990*

▼ Weapons captured from Renamo in Mozambique, South Africa continues to supply Renamo. /Gaurmy /Magnum



# SOUTH AFRICA

## ELEPHANTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE -

► Afonso Dhlakama, head of Renamo, at his headquarters in Mozambique. April 1991



### MOZAMBIQUE

As armed conflict continues to rage in Mozambique, the country's elephants are being methodically wiped out in one area after another. Since 1974, over 50,000 elephants have died (56). They now exist only in a few scattered strongholds. "Game parks have been turned into bandit headquarters ... and poaching seems unstoppable" (57).

#### POACHING BY RENAMO

Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo, claims his troops do not kill elephants (13). But Dhlakama, who was interviewed in his base at Gorongosa in central Sofala province, formerly a national park and home to thousands of elephants, is deeply implicated in poaching and ivory trading.

Dhlakama claims his troops control 85% of Mozambique. In most of these areas, elephants have been completely eliminated. Renamo has even been suspected of stationing its bases closer to elephant populations to make poaching easier and to cut down on transport. A Renamo official stated that they moved their headquarters from Gorongosa to the Zambezi to be nearer elephants (14).

Last year, EIA investigators covered miles of ground in Gorongosa and did not see a single elephant. In August 1985, when government troops over-ran Renamo headquarters in Gorongosa, large quantities of ivory were discovered (15). When they regained control of Gorongosa in 1989 a stockpile of 19,700 tusks is reported to have been found (56).

The accumulated evidence of SADF's deep involvement in Renamo poaching and smuggling is overwhelming. The October 1991 AECCG report says "Foreign aircraft have been seen flying into Renamo bases with supplies for the guerillas and leaving loaded with ivory" (56). Many of these 'foreign' aircraft will have been destined for South Africa.

#### THE TESTIMONIES OF RENAMO DESERTERS

Several Renamo deserters interviewed in different places at different times have told remarkably similar stories.

• **Former Renamo platoon commander in Sofala, 1984-1985:** "My boys used to kill 150 elephants a day, when we receive orders from South Africa at the Renamo head office." He estimated the SADF "were taking not less than 200 tusks every month from Gorongosa alone". In August 1985, he personally supervised the loading of 23 tonnes of ivory at an airstrip in the bush. He said "two planes used to come in the night to take this ivory and my soldiers used to load this ivory

to these cargo planes." His commander told him that the ivory paid for war expenses (16).

• **Tanzanian porter for Renamo, 1986:** "I remember to have also carried tusks .. These tusks were kept in MNR [Renamo] bases and whenever helicopters or other military planes came, they took these tusks with them." The planes "were labelled 'SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCES (SADF) MILITARY CARGO SERVICE' "(18).

• **Sende Candieiro, 1989:** "South African planes never stopped flying through Mozambican airspace, sometimes unloading military equipment and medicines, sometimes bringing in white instructors". On the return flight, the South African planes carried ivory, from the carcasses of elephants slaughtered by Renamo (17).

#### THE KILLING CONTINUES

Renamo poaching and ivory trafficking to South Africa continues. A March 1990 US Defence Intelligence Agency report on a visit to Chimoio says, "Renamo was using ivory to purchase goods it needed from the outside" (23). A year later investigators reported seeing tusks in Chimoio which had been seized from Renamo. A Renamo deserter confirmed in an interview in April 1991 that his section was "often tasked to go into a huge area with lots of elephants to kill the elephants for their tusks ...this operation is still continuing". They brought the tusks to a camp near the border [with South Africa], where the tusks were given to a group of whites, including a woman, who took the tusks away" (7).

*"We have the evidence that a lot of ivory has been exported through Renamo to South Africa"*

Abdul Adamo, Director of Mozambique Wildlife

Department  
April 1991

Secrets of  
Renamo's  
ivory trade  
uncovered

## VICTIMS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S FRONT LINE WAR

### ANGOLA

No-one knows how many elephants have died in the Angolan war - a recent guesstimate is up to 60,000. "Informal estimates of Angolan origin ivory now stockpiled in other countries are in the order of 40 to 60 tonnes. This provides some indication of the scale of hunting (if not its impact) and the loss of resources from Angola in the past decade" (55).

Elephants are concentrated in the south eastern region of the country, the Cuando Cubango. From there, Jonas Savimbi, head of Unita, waged war with the backing of South Africa against the MPLA government. It is in the Cuando Cubango that the elephants have suffered the severest poaching (55).

#### THE TESTIMONY OF COL. JAN BREYTENBACH

The legendary Col. Jan Breytenbach is a former commander of SADF Special Forces who spent most of his service career on operations in northern Namibia and Angola. In an interview with EIA, he vividly described how Unita and the SADF colluded in the destruction of Angolan elephant populations.


Referring to Cuando Cubango, he said "There were literally thousands and thousands of elephants in this area alone ...more game than you could ever hope to find in the Kruger National Park." By 1986... "In the whole area, I saw the spoor of five elephants." They kept just a small pocket of wildlife alive around the Unita headquarters in Jamba.

•**The Frama pipeline:** Colonel Breytenbach was working for CSI (Chief of Staff Intelligence). "They started the Frama organisation .. running teak out of Angola .. in 1980. .. it was open knowledge - official. They were running the stuff out in trucks .. all the way to South Africa without being searched.

"Then I began to pick up rumours about them also taking out ivory. I thought .. they are making use of this channel - this pipeline."The people who were running Frama were then a chap name of Lopes - 'Lobbs' - and a chap by the name of Maia. Lobbs was in Rundu [Namibia]. Maia was in Johannesburg."

The Colonel found out that ivory collected in the Caprivi by another Portuguese, Coimbra, was channelled to "Lobbs" in Rundu and then to South Africa along the Frama pipeline. Around 1987, a brigadier in the Windhoek headquarters gave permission to the traffic police to stop a Frama truck. "They found ivory .. they wanted to take it to court in Windhoek. [But] this brigadier was called in by the General and jumped upon from a dizzy height .. the case never went to court. It was squashed."

•**Military planes:** "One particular officer .. came to me. He[had] walked into the CSI stores [in Rundu] to an ammunition box, to take out ammunition, opened the box and



*"They were running the stuff out in trucks .. all the way to South Africa without being searched."*

Col. Breytenbach.

December 1989

◀ Col. Breytenbach /Reeve /EIA

there were tusks inside. So then he went to another one and more tusks, and more tusks.

"He went to his senior who was a commandant, a lieutenant-colonel ..This chap hauled him over the coals and said "You'd better shut up. .. If you put your nose into our affairs then somebody will sort you out." The officer was posted back to South Africa with "hallucinations" and "battle fatigue". The ivory was flown down to South Africa in military aircraft, marked as dental equipment.

The same officer traced a rifle used for poaching and some tusks back to fellow officer, Jose d'Oliviera. He had been flying tusks to Windhoek. He threatened the officer, "If you keep on putting your nose into this business, then somebody much higher than I .. in the organisation .. will sort you out". "The police were told from a higher authority to drop the whole story".

D'Oliviera disappeared but then resurfaced in 1989 as CSI's liaison officer with Renamo in Lisbon.

•**Smuggling goes "very high up":** At first Col. Breytenbach thought the CSI smugglers were "renegade types" until a police investigator looking into Frama told him otherwise. "You think it's only Frama and some people just above them" he said, "but it goes very, very high up in the hierarchy". .. He indicated to me that I would be surprised if I knew."

▼ Sunday Times.  
19 November 1989

# War veteran links SADF to Unita ivory slaughter

# SOUTH AFRICA

## COVER-UP BY THE SADF

### ACCIDENTS OR MURDER?

According to reliable sources, around 1983 to 1984 two men who were believed to be on the verge of exposing Frama were killed in mysterious circumstances. A nature conservator called Muller died in an accident involving an earth moving vehicle belonging to Lopes. Tapes he was carrying with him, believed to contain evidence, were missing. A police sergeant who was working with Muller died in an air crash some days later. Before his death Muller apparently accused Lopes of having threatened him (60).

### BOARD OF ENQUIRY A WHITEWASH

A Board of Enquiry set up by former Defence Minister General Magnus Malan, "found that there was no evidence to prove that the Defence Force was responsible for or involved in the killing of elephants" (19). Col. Breytenbach dismissed the enquiry as "a cover-up job." He had testified and supplied names of his informants but "they didn't go to any one of them".

While General Malan was denying Defence Force involvement in ivory smuggling, in the next breath he was admitting to hunting trips in "the free zone controlled by Unita" at the invitation of Jonas Savimbi. Former President P.W. Botha was also alleged to have taken part (20).

### OPERATION LOCK COVERS UP SADF SMUGGLING

Operation Lock, the Worldwide Fund for Nature's bungled anti-poaching operation run by ex-SAS men, offered to help South African intelligence in the "monitoring of anti-South African bodies which are situated overseas". Craig Williamson, South Africa's super spy, allegedly helped them with logistics for their operation (21). In return, it appears that Operation Lock participated in a cover-up of SADF smuggling operations.

A confidential document, believed to have been written by a "mole" planted by Williamson and detailing activities by Operation Lock, reveals that the ex-SAS men knew about Unita and Renamo poaching and SADF involvement in ivory smuggling. But "a decision was taken to avoid any possible contact with SADF personnel involved in such activities". It goes on to say, "The policy upon the discovery of such information, is to deal with it internally and pass it on to the actual command structure of the SADF personnel concerned and to take great care that such information does not fall into the hands of the media or other departments" (22).

### CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR RENAMO

The SADF denies support for Renamo in the face of overwhelming evidence. As well as the activities in Kruger, private businessmen and South African farmers in the border area are used to carry out the logistics to support Renamo with extensive back-up from the military (10,23). Some believe it is just elements in the military, but a former major in South African Military Intelligence, Nico Basson, claimed at a press conference in August 1991 that "the entire government" of South Africa was still involved in supplying Renamo. "It's not just an isolated act by the Defence Force" (24). However, these claims have been denied by the South African Government.

Basson stated that funds were also channelled through the South African state electricity company, ESKOM, to provide logistical support for Renamo (24). This has been confirmed by other sources (25,26). ESKOM has interests in the Cahorra Bassa Dam in Tete province, Mozambique and controls a ten kilometre strip of land adjoining the power lines running from Zambezi province in north central Mozambique all the way to South Africa.

*"I gave them the names of these people to go to, this Board of Enquiry. They didn't go to any one of them .. so it was just a cover up job as far as I'm concerned"*

Col. Breytenbach

December 1989

▼ SADF troops /isnews



# SOUTH AFRICA



## ARLINDO MAIA: FRONT MAN FOR THE SADF

In January 1992, a source in South Africa claimed that Portuguese businessman Arlindo Maia is active in moving ivory and rhino horn from Mozambique. "Swaziland as a conduit from Mozambique to South Africa is run by Maia and his people." Officials in Mozambique were alleged to be on Maia's payroll to "ensure his operations run smoothly".

In June 1991, a programme on the South African television station M-Net revealed that Arlindo Maia's companies served as an SADF front for supplying weapons, vehicles and other goods to Renamo in Mozambique, through a secret depot in Kosi Bay on the border between Mozambique and Natal. They also linked Maia to "white Renamo", a group of Portuguese businessmen with economic interests in Mozambique (8).

Arlindo Manuel Maia was an encyclopedia salesman until he met Jose Lopes Francisco in 1981. That same year the two agreed to front Frama Intertrading (Pty) Ltd for the SADF. They were given the use of 50 25-ton trucks, "bought and maintained with SADF cash", ostensibly for the supply of foodstuffs to Unita (27). But while Lopes was in Rundu, Maia was busy filtering money into his Johannesburg company, Getra General Trading. It has been alleged that Getra was a front to channel supplies to Mozambique (8).

Within two years Maia had become a jet-setting millionaire. In 1990 he was reported to have at least 16 personal bank accounts and to have been involved in 21 companies, one in Portugal (27).

In 1985, "large sums of Frama funds" were used to secure equipment, including trucks and a landing barge, for a sawmill operation, CMM, set up by Maia near Pemba in northern Mozambique. That same year, Maia arranged a deal in which Frama "sold" two SADF trucks to his Swaziland based transport company, Mosangol (27).

The SADF has stated that Frama was "sold" to Lopes and Maia in 1984, but sources close to both men say Frama supplied Unita with army backing until 1986. Frama was then disbanded because fighting between the two partners was considered a security risk. According to his brother, Maia was then given a contract to continue supplying Unita for another year under the name Intrafrica (27).

Maia has admitted the SADF role in Frama but denied the allegations of a "mirror operation" in Mozambique. He claimed the story was an attempt to damage his business interest there. The SADF has formally denied N-Met's claims (8).

Despite widespread allegations of fraud, no action has been taken against Maia by the South African authorities. Police investigations "petered out, supposedly for lack of evidence" (8). He allegedly told colleagues who questioned his business practices that his knowledge of sensitive issues makes him "untouchable" by the SADF (27).

## ANT WHITE

Ex-Rhodesian Selous Scout Ant White is Mozambique's most notorious ivory trader. White, a close associate of Craig Williamson's, buys poached ivory from Renamo and other sources in Mozambique. A Portuguese man called Kassim is also said to provide White with ivory bought from Frelimo and Zimbabwean army troops. Some of White's ivory is believed to be shipped out from Beira while the rest is either trucked or flown to South Africa. His trucks have South African plates and regularly travel to Johannesburg via Zimbabwe (28,29,30).

Both Zimbabwean and South African police and enforcement agencies hold files on White who is said to enjoy police protection in Beira and is friendly with the local governor of the province (28,29).

A 1991 Zimbabwean government report states that a man called Keith Mulangani allegedly received ivory from "bandit elements" (almost certainly Renamo) in Sofala Province in exchange for food and clothing. Mulangani was said to be employed by Lomaco, a Lonhro company in Mozambique, as security manager on a cotton farm 15 km north of the Beira corridor. The report alleges that he arranged for Ant White to fly into the estate on days when the manager was absent, to collect ivory. Mulangani was fired from his job when his involvement in ivory trading became known to his employers (28).

White, who has now been allowed to return to Zimbabwe, has many interests in Mozambique. Ivory is his best known export but he also is involved in a sawmill which exports timber (31).

*"Swaziland as a conduit from Mozambique to South Africa is run by Maia and his people",*

*alleged a confidential source. South Africa January 1992*

◀ *"Rags-to-riches tycoon Mr Arlindo Maia claims he is untouchable because he has too much "sensitive information" about clandestine military operations." The Star 19 March 1990*

▼ Ant White



# SOUTH AFRICA

## ELEPHANT MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA



▲ Remains of rhinos killed by Kruger Park Senior Game Ranger, Ludwig Wagener

*"We're the honey-pot of Africa as far as game is concerned - particularly rhino ... Given the lawlessness and the use of the AK47 automatic rifles which is happening throughout South Africa, we expect it will happen to us as well."*

Dr George Hughes, Director of Natal Parks Board,

January 1991

South Africa's elephants, over hunted to near extinction at the turn of the century, now number some 8,000. Immigration of herds from Mozambique, a fact often overlooked, and a variety of conservation measures enacted in Kruger National Park combined to enable recovery.

Anthony Hall-Martin, National Parks Director of Research, acknowledges that "By 1926, breeding augmented by immigration from the Gaza province of Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) had pushed the population to 100 animals. This increased to 250 by 1936... By 1964 the first helicopter count gave a figure of 2,374 elephants. Population growth and immigration continued and by 1967 the elephant population stood at 6,586, eventually reaching a maximum of 8,821 in 1970" (32).

A drought in the early 1960's "may have further contributed to the movement of elephants into the Park from Mozambique and Zimbabwe" (33). The Park was fenced in 1974, but some movement still occurs from Zimbabwe.

The fencing of Kruger trapped large numbers of Mozambique's elephants in South Africa. Hall-Martin states "The Park is fenced on all sides including an elephant proof fence on the boundary with Mozambique and less robust fences on the western boundary... These fences did have ecological effects by cutting animals off from traditional seasonal grazing areas and dry season water sources."

The planned extension of Kruger into Mozambique would allow elephants to regain their former range and assist in the recovery of Mozambique's beleaguered elephant population. But while the area remains the centre of intense, and seemingly unaccountable military activity, the benefit to elephants must be outweighed by the danger such an unstable situation poses.

Culling was introduced in Kruger even though the density of elephants is low - less than 0.4 animals per square kilometre. Although many elephants originated in Mozambique, the profits from culling have gone into Kruger. The relatively small revenue from the sale of elephant products could be replaced by raising park fees by less than \$1 a head if South Africa were to continue a ban on trade.

The wisdom of continuing elephant culls is questionable. Rumours have surfaced that through excessive culling Kruger may have considerably less than 8,000 elephants. This is not substantiated, but could best be tested if South Africa were to release census data for independent review.

## POACHING AND CORRUPTION

Around two years ago, Anthony Hall-Martin stated "No cases of elephant poaching have been recorded since 1983" (54). Unfortunately this is no longer the case. In 1991, 27 elephants were known to have been killed in Kruger Park, while poachers attacked rhino in Natal's game reserves (34). Mozambican refugees have been blamed for the killings, but as the case of Ludwig Wagener shows, South Africa's Parks staff are not immune from poaching and corruption.

### SENIOR GAME RANGERS POACHING

**Kruger:** On the 5th December 1991, Ludwig Wagener, a former senior game ranger in Kruger, was sentenced to five years imprisonment (35). Between 1978 and 1988, Wagener killed 29 white rhino and four elephants in the military section of the park (36). Police investigators said his rhino horns ended up with Pong in Pretoria, via a middleman who has since died (34).

Anthony Hall-Martin admitted to knowing about Wagener for four years before his arrest, but claimed he had no evidence to take action (37).

**Natal:** In February 1988, six senior game rangers from Natal's Umfolozi Game Reserve were arrested for poaching rhino. Their smuggling racket had been going on over a period of ten years(38).

### INCREASE IN ARMS A THREAT

1990 saw an onslaught by poachers in Hluhluwe and Umfolozi Game Reserves. Between May and the end of the year, seven rhino were shot in Umfolozi, all with AK47s (39). "Mozambicans come through the corridor between Ndumu and Tembe game reserves. They sell arms to South Africans who poach rhino in Umfolozi and Hluhluwe", said one source (34).

In January 1991, George Hughes, Director of Natal Parks Board, declared war on the poachers. A news report said, "the Board is facing increasingly sophisticated and well-armed poaching operations". Heavier penalties were not deterring the poachers. "Increasing levels of unemployment and crime suggest this will do little to dent the lure of the game trade". (39). "We're the honey-pot of Africa as far as game is concerned - particularly rhino ... Given the lawlessness and the use of the AK47 automatic rifles which is happening throughout South Africa, we expect it will happen to us as well."

## Rhino skeletons: Ranger in court

By Clyde Johnson  
Lowveld Bureau

**SKUKUZA** — Former senior game ranger Ludwig Jacobus Johannes Wagener, yesterday pleaded not guilty to 44 charges of theft, illegal hunting and housebreaking in the reserve.

Mr Wagener's appearance before regional court magistrate Thys de Wit follows the discovery in October last year of 29



In court ... ex-ranger Ludwig Wagener.

# SOUTH AFRICA

## ESPU SEIZURES

- **21st September 1990:** intercepted 9 parcels containing 51 rhino horns. Arrested Peter Liu (Taiwanese) and Charles Fertoen (South African Chinese). Raid on Liu's house produced 6 tusks, 14 kg of ivory blocks and packing materials (47).
- **September 1990:** seized 9 parcels containing 53 horns, posted in Manzini, Swaziland, addressed to Taipei, Taiwan (47).
- **January 1991:** Zaireans caught with ivory tusks and 29 rhino horns, brought to South Africa to swap for stolen cars (47).
- **13th August 1991:** arrested 2 Zaireans at Johannesburg hotel with 1,115 ivory blocks smuggled from Lusaka. Ivory originated Zaire, carved in Zambia, consigned by air as "baby rattles" (49).
- **23rd August 1991:** raided Johannesburg curio shop of Taiwanese Chen Liang Chen. Found 2,667 (145 kg) of ivory blocks (49).
- **6th July 1991:** arrested Dr. Dries Gouws for flying 9 tusks from Namibia to South Africa (49).
- **14th October 1991:** arrested Lucas Nell in Cape Town for bringing 37 tusks (approx 500 kg) from Namibia (49).
- **December 1991:** arrested 3 people for bringing 4 tusks (70kg) from Botswana in a tractor tyre (58).
- **24th January 1992:** Malawian army major and dealer arrested in Malawi with 112 tusks, after joint operation with Malawi Police (59).

## CARVING FACTORIES IN PIETERSBURG AND DURBAN

Several sources have referred to "a lot of illicit carving" in the Pietersburg area of northern Transvaal. A Johannesburg based Chinese jeweller is believed to be channelling ivory in from Swaziland to his carving factory there. Ivory is also brought in from Mozambique (48,51,52).

Around July 1990, an illegal carving factory was discovered accidentally in a Durban back street by a local reporter. He was searching for an address when he stumbled across Indian carvers cutting ivory into blocks. He left in a hurry and contacted the authorities but by the time they returned the carvers had cleared out (53).

◀ Arrest of Taiwanese rhino horn smuggler by ESPU September 1990 /ESPU

*In the port of Durban, on any one day, there are 3,000 containers waiting to be shipped.*

Natal enforcement official.



## ALL ROADS LEAD TO SOUTH AFRICA

Most ivory smuggling routes in the region find their way to South Africa. Major Pieter Lategan, head of the Endangered Species Protection Unit (ESPU), in a series of successful operations, has arrested over 140 people in connection with ivory and rhino horn smuggling in 1991 alone. He told EIA that ivory was being smuggled in from every country in the region from as far north as Zaire. The arrests made by ESPU could just be "the tip of the iceberg".

The rand, the only real hard currency in the region, draws smugglers like a magnet. The undercover network set up to defy international sanctions has facilitated the movement of ivory and rhino horn, invariably smuggled together, both into and out of the country. The routes and methods are those pioneered by drugs smugglers.

Despite ESPU's successes over the last two years, enforcement officers have admitted that the ivory traffic through South Africa cannot be controlled. Under the Customs Union agreement between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland, a container sealed in one country cannot be opened inside the Union. In the port of Durban, on any one day there are 3,000 containers waiting to be shipped.

## THE TAIWAN CONNECTION

Taiwan is one of the main destinations for ivory and rhino horn smuggled out of South Africa. Throughout the years of international isolation, South Africa developed close trade links with Taiwan to facilitate sanctions busting. Many Taiwanese are South African residents. Since January 1990, when the ban on ivory trade went into effect in South Africa, several Taiwanese have been arrested for trafficking ivory and horn. Much of the ivory that was seized by police was already carved into oblong blocks ready to be fashioned into personalised hanko in Japan. Stacked together in parcels or boxes, the blocks are easier to smuggle than tusks.

▼ Zaireans caught with 1,115 ivory blocks in Johannesburg. Smuggled from Lusaka as "baby rattles" 13 August 1991 /ESPU



# SOUTH AFRICA

Pongs: "The single largest CITES problem in southern Africa". (40)

## THE JOHANNESBURG AND PRETORIA IVORY MAFIA

When the question "who controls ivory smuggling?" is put to well-informed sources in South Africa, the same names invariably come up. At the top of the list is the notorious Pong family. Then there are the "Greek mafia", "the Portuguese" (see Arlindo Maia) and "the Italians", all operating from Johannesburg and Pretoria.

### THE PONG FAMILY

A confidential report to CITES describes the Pong family as "the single largest CITES problem in southern Africa" (40).

A.H. Pong and his three sons, Lau Kwong-Cheong, Lau Kwong-Gee and Lau Kwong-Tune, have been major players in the ivory and rhino horn trade for many years. One or other has been caught smuggling on more than one occasion, but either the charges were dropped or the fine was insignificant. When the decision was made to ban the international ivory trade, the Hong Kong premises of the family's Rand Company was believed to house a stockpile of around 40 tonnes of ivory (41).

The Pongs' South African companies, Statex and A.H. Pong and Sons, are run from a heavily fortified building in Pretoria. There the business, ostensibly trade in retail clothing and copper scrap, appears to be run by Cheong and Gee.



### LYING LOW

The Pongs have been lying low since Tony Vieira was caught at the Kazungula border post between Zambia and Botswana in October 1988. He was smuggling ivory, horn, skins and cobalt in a false compartment hidden in his truck from Zaire to South Africa (41). The consignee of the shipment, pertaining to be "copper scrap", was A.H. Pong and Sons (42).

► A.H. Pong - the 'Godfather' /ESPU

▼ Cheong and Gee Pong (l) - 'The sons', outside their Pretoria premises /ESPU





# SOUTH AFRICA

Vieira was fined but Cheong Pong disclaimed all knowledge of the smuggled goods and escaped prosecution.

Pong was desperate to recover Vieira's truck from Botswana customs. He even offered money for its return through his lawyers. An undiscovered hidden compartment containing gems was thought to be his motive (43).

## TRUCKS ON THE MOVE AGAIN

Vieira's truck was one of a number of "Pong's trucks", mostly owned by Portuguese, which plied the Kazungula route between April 1988 and April 1989 (40). Then, probably because of close surveillance after the Vieira incident, they changed route. Last year, the trucks started using the Kazungula crossing again on their way from Chingola near the Zambia/Zaire border to a bonded warehouse, c/o A.H.Pong and Sons, in Pretoria. According to documentation, the containers were carrying copper scrap and were in transit to Africa Trading in Hong Kong - to the same address as that of the Rand Company (44,45).


In November 1991, a source with close links in the Johannesburg underworld told EIA that the Pongs were still moving ivory through Zambia and Botswana. He said, "It's the same routes, the same people".

## A CARVING FACTORY IN LUBUMBASHI

After the Vieira incident, Pong allegedly bought two trucks and had them specially fitted with concealed compartments for Yoko Mulaba from Lubumbashi in Zaire (43). Lubumbashi, near the border with Zambia, is the home of the Pongs' carving factory (40).

## THE GREEK HOTELIER

A well known hotelier and allegedly head of the "Greek mafia" in Johannesburg is reported by several sources to be heavily involved in smuggling ivory, rhino horn and drugs. He also has close dealings with members of the infamous Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB). One of his hotels provided a base for their operations in Johannesburg. Part of SADF Special Forces, the CCB was responsible for organising "hit squads" to assassinate anti-apartheid activists. Before his rise to infamy in South Africa, the hotelier was kicked out of Zambia in a crackdown on corruption and drugs smuggling (43).



## TONI GIANNINI AND RUACANA SAFARIS

▲ Toni Giannini of Ruacana Safaris /De Wet Potgieter

Antonio (Toni) Giannini is a major ivory dealer whose company, Ruacana Safari and Game Industry, operates out of Johannesburg. Despite Giannini's "name as an honest businessman", Ruacana is reported to have been under investigation for smuggling ivory from northern Namibia. Giannini is alleged to have a carving factory in Namibia (46).

## COLLUSION WITH TRANSVAAL NATURE CONSERVATION ON IVORY SALE TO JAPAN

Toni Giannini tried to sell over a tonne of ivory to Japan after the Japanese ban on trade went into effect on the 19th September 1989. On the 10th November, Transvaal Nature Conservation wrote to Mr Takimoto in the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, on behalf of Ruacana, urging him "on humanitarian grounds to make an exception in this case and allow a special import of at least the 1066.1 kg raw ivory by Takaichi Ivory Trading Co. or as an alternative, to allow the import of the ivory by the original client, Joyo Tsusho Co." They tried to claim the shipment was legal since negotiations were started before the ban went into effect.

REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA EXPORT DECLARATION FORM		No. 000000	
1. Exporter (Name, Reg./Office Address) JLN SCRAP METAL ENTERPRISES LIMITED P.O. Box 11030 GHINSHOLA ZAMBIA		2a. Contract Sale Yes / No	
5. Consignee (Name, address) AFRICA TRADING, TRADE BUILDING 6TH FLOOR 49 OLIVAN STREET, HONG KONG O/O AN FONG & SONS, P.O. BOX 10221, PRETORIA WEST 0117, BONDED WAREHOUSES PTOOSSE PRYVOTOLA IN TRANSIT		2b. Proforma Invoice/ Order ref.	
7. Freight Forwarder (Name, address) SELF		3. Customs Entry No. & Date K 12 18 / 191	
11a. Mode of transport <input type="checkbox"/> Rail <input type="checkbox"/> Air <input type="checkbox"/> Road <input type="checkbox"/> Lakes <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify)		4. Type of Export a. Open Stock b. TANKS c. Ex bonded Stock d. Other (specify)	
13. Value in US\$ US\$ 2250.78		6. Buyer (if other than consignee) (Name, address) AFRICA TRADING	
14. Mode of payment <input type="checkbox"/> Advance payment <input type="checkbox"/> Letter of credit <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify)		8. Exporter's address (Name, address) STANBANK BARR, P.O. BOX 10130 GHINSHOLA	
17. Coastal Port of loading KAZUNGULA		9. Country of origin ZAMBIA	
19. Shipping marks, container & kind of package, goods description EXCESS SCRAP METAL BEING OF COPPER		10. Country of destination R.S.A.	
20. Tariff Code 740120		11. Amount received to be received R 15000.00 (15000)	
21. Statistical Quantity (a) Unit (b) Quantity (c) Gross Weight KG 25000 25000 KG		15. Payment due date EIGHT AGAINST DOCUMENTS	

◀ Consignment of "copper scrap" for A.H. Pong and Sons. In transit to Hong Kong 27 July 1991

# SWAZILAND / MOZAMBIQUE

## SWAZILAND

Swaziland has been described as a clearing house for ivory and rhino horn on its way to South Africa from Mozambique and Zambia. Large quantities of ivory are known to have been flown to Swaziland from Lusaka; seizures both in Lusaka and Manzini testify to this (see Zambia). The route from Mozambique is allegedly run by Portuguese (see Arlindo Maia).

The large Taiwanese population in Swaziland presents a real problem for the authorities. In the last few years significant numbers of Swazi rhino have been poached. The horns seized in parcels in Johannesburg were believed to have come from a major Taiwanese agricultural development project in Swaziland (47,50). Taiwanese embassy officials have also been involved in smuggling. The trail of one consignment of rhino horn led to the former ambassador's door (50).

The efforts of customs officers and conservationists in Swaziland are frustrated by poor enforcement. Although the woman in Manzini post office said she could recognise the Taiwanese who sent the parcels, police did not follow up the case (50). There are hopes that the recent introduction of heavy penalties will deter poachers and smugglers, but as long as other southern African countries persist in undermining the ban on ivory trade, Swazi conservationists will be fighting an uphill battle.

## MOZAMBIQUE THE LEGACY OF WAR

Mozambique has been ravaged by war for over two decades. The scale of human and environmental destruction is massive. War and poverty have provided poachers and traders with a virtual playground for their illegal activities. All of Mozambique's national parks and reserves are located in areas destabilised by the war, abandoned by staff and completely unprotected. Once famed for their beauty and the abundance of wildlife, they have become battlefields and military strongholds (1,2).

Mozambique's elephants are among the casualties of war, their ivory part of the spoils. In 1974 they numbered between 50,000 and 66,500 and were increasing. In 1990 the population was estimated at 13,350 and decreasing. This figure is considered an optimistic "guesstimate" (2). The remnants of the once great herds are now restricted to a few relatively inaccessible strongholds, mostly in the northern provinces of Tete, Niassa and Cabo Delgado, but even these are now coming under fire.

Mozambique's war, and the demise of its elephants, is intimately linked with neighbouring countries, partly because of its strategic coastal location and partly because of its proximity to South Africa. For over ten years South Africa has armed and trained the Renamo rebels despite a 1984 peace agreement with the Frelimo government. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, has stationed thousands of troops in Mozambique to support Frelimo and protect the Beira Corridor, its outlet to the Indian Ocean. The armies of all four parties - South Africa, Zimbabwe, Frelimo and Renamo - have been deeply involved in poaching and ivory smuggling, both for personal gain and to support the war effort.

In addition to the army units which are stationed throughout the country, there are thousands of civilian militiamen and women, all armed with automatic rifles. In contrast with the food shortages, weapons are in plentiful supply. "In most areas where a human population exists, wild animals are shot for food" (2).

An end to the civil war is urgently needed before any effective measures can be taken to protect the country's dwindling elephant population. Since Renamo's strength is in the battlefield, not the political arena, this is unlikely to happen without a considerable degree of external interest and mediation.

## IVORY FOR ARMS AND PROFIT

Renamo rebels are responsible for wiping out large numbers of Mozambique's elephants. The ivory is exported both directly from Maputo and Beira and via South Africa and Malawi, to pay for military supplies (1,2,12).

► Rhino shot for its horn in Swaziland / Cole



Swaziland: A clearing house  
for ivory and rhino horn

# MOZAMBIQUE

## SMUGGLERS AND THEIR ROUTES

Renamo generally stores its ivory until its buyers can collect it by plane from one of many isolated airstrips (1). Joa Tiago Ribeiro, a wildlife official from Manica Province, said that "Ivory is transported from Macossa to Gorongosa [Renamo headquarters] by plane. In most of these areas you need planes. There aren't any roads" (11).

On 18th April 1991, Frelimo troops captured hundreds of documents when they overran the Renamo "presidential base" at Nhamagoda in central Sofala province. One, believed to have been written by Afonso Dhlakama, head of Renamo, asks for the "price of every missile [and] ..the price of every kilogram of ivory. Renamo can arrange the ivory. Renamo can arrange the landing strip for the plane." (3).

Zimbabwe National Army troops have also taken their slice of Mozambique's "ivory pie" (see Zimbabwe section). Soldiers stationed along the Beira Corridor have been involved in poaching and the ivory shipped to Zimbabwe "in military aircraft and trucks" (2).

Mozambican government soldiers are poaching elephants and smuggling ivory in the northernmost province of Cabo Delgado (4,5). According to provincial wildlife official Armando Cossa, military commanders are "employing poachers, sending them into the Mueda region [near the Tanzanian border] under their orders and protection". The "most dangerous" poachers, however, are "groups of armed militiamen who wander through the bush killing elephants without the slightest control" (4).

Frelimo troops have also been reported poaching near the Marromeu Swamps, east of Gorongosa. A professional hunter "was reliably informed by his pilot that Frelimo troops regularly wipe out entire herds of game animals including ...elephants, using helicopter gunships and firing upon the herds from the air." (6). Another source told EIA "the Chief of Military Operations has his hands in ivory ..in the Marromeu Swamp. Not many people go there, so that's why the elephants do" (7).

Poaching gangs regularly cross into Mozambique from neighbouring countries. Zambians and Malawians hunt elephants in Tete Province while "aggressive bands of Tanzanians and Somalis operate along the Rovuma and Lugenda Valleys in Cabo Delgado and Niassa Provinces" (2,4).

Ivory is smuggled out of Mozambique by sea through the ports of Pemba, Beira and Maputo (2,12), and along well established smuggling routes through South Africa, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and into Tanzania and Zambia in the north. The smugglers include ZNA troops, the SADF, Renamo rebels, Mozambican refugees, government troops, Portuguese businessmen, corrupt officials and influential businessmen based in Mozambique and Johannesburg (see South Africa, Zimbabwe and Malawi sections). Between them they are draining Mozambique of its wildlife and other resources.

## TCT / EMOFAUNA

Emofauna is the government registered company responsible for exporting wildlife products from Mozambique. Since the government decided not to enter a reservation after the African elephant was listed on Appendix I, legal exports of ivory are now banned from Mozambique.

Justino Matias, Director General of Emofauna, described how most of their legal exports of ivory from culling and confiscations went to Japan. Most was shipped out and some transported by plane. "We worked through legal tender" he said in an interview. "Auction ivory is white gold. ..The last big buyer was Miackoshi Shogi from Tokyo. Some went by ship to Yokohama harbour. His contact was Marumi, a South African company based in Johannesburg" (9).

Transport Commodity Trading (TCT), an import / export company based in Maputo and Beira, handled the logistics for Emofauna before the ban on ivory trading. Their representative in Maputo, Felipe Franco, said in an interview that because of the war Emofauna was unable to handle ivory marketing, so "TCT played a logistical role. We had fax machines, telephones. We could speak English. We could write the letters, do the translations. We handled the shipping" (10).

TCT's representative in Beira is Ant White.


*"You can't push the army security around. They have the guns"*

Abdul Adamo, Director of Mozambique's Wildlife Department, April 1991



◀ Renamo members captured with Ivory and arms near the South African border / A. Nilson / AIM

# BOTSWANA



## THE LAST FRONTIER

"Only in Botswana is it possible to approach some of the elephant herds closely and to sense their trust, a trust that will be shattered if the marksmen from Zimbabwe are invited in. To live among these wandering giants is to breathe the air of a vanishing freedom. For the moment Botswana remains their last true kingdom" (1).

Some of Africa's least disturbed elephant herds can be found in Botswana, but economic interests and the influence of neighbouring countries are now putting these populations at risk.

Botswana's elephants number between 49,064 and 68,900 (2), although many in Botswana believe the upper figure to be extremely optimistic. Most elephants live in and around Chobe National Park - the Chobe and Linyanti river fronts have offered sanctuary to thousands of refugee elephants fleeing from Angola, Namibia and Zambia, where poaching has been intense.

In addition, Botswana remains a major route for ivory smugglers moving shipments, mainly into South Africa.

Botswana has stated its intention to cull at least 3,000 elephants and sell their skins and ivory through the Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing (SACIM), ignoring concerns voiced by its citizens and scientists about the lack of ecological or economic reasons for culling.

Given that Botswana's elephants are part of a regional population, it is likely that herds which have sought sanctuary from armed conflict would be threatened with culling. With the cessation of hostilities, these herds could re-colonise their former range in Angola and Namibia.

## CULLING - WHO BENEFITS?

Like Zimbabwe, Botswana argues that culling will benefit local people. In fact only a handful of people with a direct financial interest will profit. Tribal elders of Ngamiland have opposed the plan but the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) supports the pro-cull lobby.


Botswana Game Industries is speculating that trade in ivory will resume. The company hopes to build an elephant processing plant near Kasane, close to Chobe National Park (3).

Zimbabwe, a self-styled 'role model' for wildlife issues, has had significant influence on Botswana's fledgling elephant management plans and many local people fear that this will negatively affect Botswana's elephants.


Speedy Holden, a Zimbabwean who runs a number of wildlife companies in Zimbabwe and who has experience with culling elephants, told EIA that "We've been chasing a cull in Botswana for nine years now. We want the contract" (5).

Local vet Larry Patterson, on behalf of Kalahari Game Services, was reportedly seeking the contract to cull, probably with help from Zimbabwe (4). Patterson is closely connected to the Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS) which, at the 1989 CITES meeting, opposed Appendix I for African elephants.

However the most recent KCS policy document shows a change of view: they have realised that Botswana's elephants should remain on Appendix I (12), and that any resumption of ivory trading would "affect other countries' efforts to manage their elephant populations". It would seem that the recent democratisation of KCS - whereby members may have a say in policy - has begun to reflect more accurately the views of Botswana's people.



► Elephant skins in a Botswana Game Industries tannery. The shape of things to come.....? /Reed/Panos



## OPPOSITION TO CULLING

There has been vociferous opposition to culling. A tribal meeting was held in June 1990, at which the local people were told about Botswana's plans to cull elephants. Mr Isaac Tudor, who attended the meeting, reported that they "do not see the need for culling of elephants" (6), although rumour has it that some have now been 'persuaded' of the need (7).

### LOCAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST CULLING:

- ◆ live elephants are more valuable to more people. Local people gain regular employment from tourism and fear that the proposed culls will discourage tourists.
- ◆ people are wary of the special interests promoting the kills, and are concerned that building an elephant abattoir will result in the depletion of Chobe's elephant herds.
- ◆ "The introduction of culling in other countries has brought in corruption and bribery" (8).
- ◆ There is concern that elephant numbers may be overestimated.
- ◆ There is no scientific proof that cropping elephants will have any beneficial effect.

A local meeting in 1990 of conservationists, scientists, wildlife managers and producers concluded that there was no economic or ecological reason to cull elephants (6).

## NO NEED TO CULL

### .....Economically

A culling operation is enormously expensive, and can be economically justified only when there are significant profits to be made.

Jonathan Barnes, an economist in Botswana's DWNP has stated that, under present market conditions, culling is not economically viable (9).

### .....Or Ecologically

### COUNTING

Scientists admit that there are inherent difficulties in counting methodology, and that no trend can be indicated to claim that elephants are increasing, stable or in decline in Botswana (9).

The most recent elephant count in Botswana surveyed only 4% of elephant range (10).

### IMMIGRATION

Thousands of elephants migrate between Zimbabwe, northern Botswana and Namibia's Caprivi Strip. Large numbers of elephants have recently appeared in the western Caprivi, close to the Kwando river. These 'could only have come from Botswana' (11).

There is also potential for elephants to re-colonise their former range in Angola, now that the peace settlement has been agreed. A conservationist in the Chobe area believes that "now hostilities have ceased in Angola, we could see up to half of our elephants moving back in there" (11).

### VEGETATION CHANGE

The current state of knowledge about the interaction between elephants and vegetation is not sufficient to conclude that culling is the answer.

KCS has recently admitted that vegetation 'damage' is low in Botswana and that there is only 'localised damage' on the Chobe/Linyanti water fronts where elephants are concentrated in the dry season (12).

Dr Keith Lindsay, an ecologist with the DWNP, states that "Ecological systems...are naturally dynamic. Change is normal and constancy is rare. A certain amount of damage to vegetation...is normal in a naturally functioning ecosystem" (9).

On studies of elephant/vegetation interaction Lindsay comments that "none of these studies has looked at woodland dynamics through time, directly linking changes in mature canopy woodland to the increase in elephant numbers" (9). He argues that "If the elephant/woodland interaction is allowed to continue, experiences from elsewhere in Africa suggest that catastrophe is unlikely" (9).

▲ Elephants swimming from Botswana to Namibia, October 1991 / Gleizes / EIA

*"I do not believe that there has ever been any management of elephants in Botswana - ever. It is a pity that the first time elephant management is discussed, a negative option like culling comes to the fore" (24).*

# BOTSWANA



## PICTURE POSTCARD PARKS?

Lindsay echoes Zimbabwe in acknowledging that culling is primarily a matter of aesthetic choice and not of ecological necessity.

"In the end it is human values which define the acceptability of habitat impact by elephants" (9).

In spite of all this, Botswana's decision to cull elephants is claimed to be ecologically based.

## SACIM - BOTSWANA'S MILLSTONE

Botswana, the richest country in the SACIM cartel, has offered to finance and house the auction centre, where ivory and skins from culled elephants as well as confiscated poached ivory from Botswana, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Malawi will be sold on the international market.

While the auction house and its stocks will belong to SACIM as a group, it will be Botswana which will have to provide security and protect the system from abuse.

The SACIM agreement stipulates that every member must allow raw ivory exports only through SACIM and forbid

private dealing or re-sale of raw ivory (13). History shows that, while ivory is still internationally tradeable, the resulting corruption will ensure that Botswana will be unable to enforce this.

The inadequacy of border controls and Botswana's membership of the Customs Union (see South Africa section) pose a serious threat to enforcement. As a major conduit for ivory smuggling, Botswana is not in a position to give any guarantees of security.

## ILLEGAL TRADE

For years Botswana has been a major smuggling route for ivory and rhino horn in transit from Zambia, Zaire and Malawi. In his report to CITES in 1989, Rowan Martin of Zimbabwe's DNPWM referred to the 'large amount of illegal worked ivory entering Botswana'. Martin believed that Zimbabwean ivory was travelling this route and had 'flooded the South African market' (14).

The seizure of a large consignment of ivory and rhino horn at the Kazungula border post in 1988, on its way to A.H. Pong in South Africa, illustrates that this is also a major route for raw ivory moving into South Africa from countries to the north, using Botswana as a transit point.

It is reported that after the Kazungula seizure Pong's trucks were re-routed to avoid Botswana for a while but that, in recent months, they have begun to use the Kazungula

▼ Pong's ivory was found in a hidden compartment in this truck



### IN DECEMBER 1991 ZAMBIAN TRUCK DRIVERS GAVE EIA INVESTIGATORS THEIR REASONS FOR PREFERRED THE BOTSWANA ROUTE:

- 1) The Customs Union agreement allows trucks, once in Botswana, to pass into South Africa without being searched.
- 2) Many of the drivers do not have visas for Zimbabwe, and do not need them for Botswana.
- 3) The Kazungula border post is undermanned and ill-equipped.

# BOTSWANA

border post again (see South Africa section).

Raw ivory is still moving through Botswana. Recently the South African EPU arrested three men from Selebi Phikwe in Botswana who were smuggling ivory to Johannesburg, hidden in a tractor tyre (15).

In November 1991 customs officials in Zambia described to EIA numerous consignments of worked and raw ivory which they had intercepted on their way into Botswana. The ivory comes from Zambia, Malawi and Zaire.

Louis Nchindo, chair of KCS and head of the government's diamond agency Debswana, was reportedly caught by the Botswana army hunting buffalo and lion without a licence and he spent a night in jail as a result. The hunting party consisted of some of the richest and most 'respected' men in Botswana and later the Botswana army was said to have made a mistake. The accusation of poaching was withdrawn (20).

"Problem animal control" has reportedly been used as an excuse for killing elephants in the vicinity of the Mpandamatenga agricultural complex on the Zimbabwe border. Hundreds of animals, including elephants, are said to be poached under this pretext.

EIA investigators were told in February 1991 that two South African companies had been involved in poaching in Mpandamatenga (21).

## DEVELOPMENT TAKES PRECEDENCE

The lack of control over Mpandamatenga reflects another serious problem within Botswana and the southern African region; poor or non-existent planning of major developments which conflict with land use and wildlife management programmes of neighbouring countries.

Mpandamatenga complex, which receives huge government subsidies (22), was developed without any environmental impact assessment. Poaching in the area has increased but, nonetheless, a major expansion of the complex is being considered which would further threaten elephants and other species.

## CATTLE OR WILDLIFE?

Botswana's cattle population has doubled since 1966 to around 2.5 million with catastrophic ecological consequences: serious overgrazing, environmental degradation and the decline of wildlife. A 150-mile-long cattle fence in Ngamiland, constructed to satisfy EC beef standards, has sliced across prime elephant habitat and will destroy large numbers of wild animals.

Again, no environmental impact assessment was carried out, despite the deaths of hundreds of thousands of wildebeest, buffalo and other species caused by previously constructed fences.

Botswana's deputy director of wildlife, Nigel Hunter, whose post is funded by Britain's Overseas Development Agency, acknowledged that, although no environmental impact assessment had been carried out, resulting mortalities of wild animals would be "acceptable". Asked what level was "acceptable", Mr Hunter replied "About 2 or 3 per cent. I haven't really agonised about where we draw the line" (23).

Having caused appalling degradation in other areas, a further 50,000 cattle will now be able to invade the newly-fenced region northwest of the Okavango, the "last frontier" of unexploited wildlife habitat.

The wealthy and influential elite of Botswana, including politicians and businessmen, own the largest herds and account for 85% of the country's lucrative exports to the EC on favourable terms.

## TOURISM EARNS THE MOST REVENUE

Botswana has invested little in its tourist infrastructure. It has a high-cost, low-density tourism policy which is believed to be worth twenty times more to the country than the total market value of all elephant products: ivory, skins and meat (6).

There are enormous opportunities to develop ecologically sound tourism in the Chobe National Park and it would be uneconomical in the long term to ignore them in favour of lethal use of elephants.

Francistown, Botswana:

"The smuggling capital of Africa" (17)

**UNDECLARED ON EXIT**  
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

Found in the car. TIME 12:10  
(BH 5943) M/BEZ  
NOTICE OF SEIZURE

021611  
EJ

To (owner of goods or person from whom seized) MR. A. LEDA, CHAMPANKHWA  
P. O. Box #1126, Lilongwe, Malawi

You are hereby notified that the goods described below have been seized in terms of the Customs and Excise Act, because there are reasonable grounds for believing that they are liable to forfeiture.

Goods seized:  
666 x IVORY FINGER RINGS  
89 x IVORY NECKLACES  
27 x ELEPHANT TAIL BANGLES  
3 x IVORY BANGLES

You are warned that these goods may be declared to be forfeited by the Controller of Customs and Excise in terms of section 17(7) of the Customs and Excise Act, or they may be released if the Controller considers that they should not be forfeited. You say, if you wish, make representations to the Controller for the release of the goods within three months from the date of this notice. Additionally or alternatively you may, within three months from the date of this notice, institute proceedings for the recovery of the goods from the Controller. If the Controller does not release the goods following representations made by you or if you do not institute proceedings within the period specified and if the Controller declares the goods to be forfeited, the goods will become the property of the Government of Zambia without compensation.

Your attention is drawn to sections 17(7) of the Customs and Excise Act.

A. M. P.

A source in southern Africa told EIA in February 1991 that a container full of ivory from Malawi had been driven through Botswana to South Africa. The shipment belonged to a Malawian based in Gaborone, who frequently moves ivory through Botswana to South Africa concealed in a truck.

Botswana is home to Hans Beck, a well-known ivory dealer who reportedly has had a warrant out for his arrest on ivory smuggling charges in South Africa since 1983. He managed to jump bail and escape to the safety of Botswana where he is based in Francistown, operating from Ivory Products Ltd. He also owns African Safari & Game Industries Ltd in Johannesburg (16).

Beck's girlfriend described Francistown to the South African press as "the smuggling capital of Africa" and said that there was "a growing trade in ivory and rhino horn" (17).

Dave Lawson of the DWNP has admitted that Botswana is a major conduit for ivory smuggling. The ivory, he explained, comes through Gaborone, Francistown, Plumtree and Bulawayo (18).


## OTHER THREATS TO WILDLIFE IN BOTSWANA

### ILLEGAL HUNTING

In 1990 Mr Maitshwarelo Dabutha, Member of Parliament for Gaborone North, asked a question in the House regarding poaching and the use of private airstrips in the Tuli Block area bordering South Africa. According to Mr Dabutha, farmers denied police access to their airstrips (19). Safari hunters and tour operators are said to fly in undetected. One safari company in South Africa is said to have offered elephant hunting trips to Botswana despite a ban on elephant hunting since 1983.

◀ Zambian Customs seizure - One of many

# NAMIBIA



African occupation, poor enforcement and the fact that its elephants share their range with neighbouring countries which have suffered severe poaching, has served to make elephant conservation very difficult.

Penalties for offences relating to ivory and rhino horn have increased dramatically, but Namibia remains a conduit for the ivory smugglers.

## A REGIONAL POPULATION

Namibia's elephants are regarded by the Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism as part of "a regional elephant population" which is "of international origin and importance" (1).

Namibian elephants share much of their range with southern Zambia, northern Botswana and southern Angola and elephants are "guaranteed to continue spilling over into Namibia from neighbouring countries, particularly Botswana" (1).

Elephants in the Caprivi constantly cross into Botswana and back. Left to their own devices, they could re-colonise southern Angola where elephants have been decimated by years of military conflict.

## NAMIBIA WILL SELL ITS NEIGHBOURS' IVORY

Namibia has joined the Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing (SACIM) and will use the Gaborone centre to market ivory internationally. Given the regional nature of the elephant population, this means that poached ivory sold by Namibia will come from areas whose elephant populations have been decimated by years of war and poaching, such as Zambia and Angola.

The effect of this on other countries will be significant: "several thousand" elephants in Namibia are regarded as

## CITES WELCOMES NAMIBIA

Namibia joined CITES in March 1990 with a reservation on the African elephant. This was to be expected, given the tremendous historical influence of South Africa, from whose political domination Namibia had just emerged, and given the complex network of political and security links which exist between the two countries.

Namibia's long history of smuggling during the South

▼ Namibia's rare desert elephants - only 34 remain (15).  
/L A Carter







◀ Dr Dries Gouws (left) is arrested in South Africa by the ESPU / ESPU

*It seems certain that peace in neighbouring Angola will result in large numbers of 'Namibian' elephants moving northward.*

"seasonal visitors only" (1), yet management plans for these elephants include culling, should the 'national' population exceed the desired level of 10,000. Namibia's domestic management programme acknowledges, but fails to take into account, the regional nature of the elephant population. Thus, non resident elephants would be culled in Namibia and revenue from their ivory would end up in Namibian coffers.

It is premature to establish maximum population levels, since the potential for elephants to re-colonise some of their former range is significant in Namibia. Already, groups of elephants are moving into areas outside parks, following the end of military activity (1). The long-term effects of this re-colonisation will not be known for many years. It seems certain, however, that peace in neighbouring Angola will result in large numbers of 'Namibian' elephants moving northward.

## POACHING INCREASES IN THE CAPRIVI

Former SADF commander Colonel Jan Breytenbach told EIA that in the late 1980s poachers began to cross into the western Caprivi from Angola. They found carcasses of elephants and tyre tracks leading back across the border. He believed the culprits to be UNITA rebels.

In 1990 elephant poaching in the western Caprivi was reported to be increasing. The poaching was being carried out by Batswana and Zambians as well as Caprivians (2).

Concern was expressed by an unnamed game scout that, if this poaching was not halted, the elephant 'would be depleted in the next ten years'. The scout also said that sport hunting of elephants, legalised in order to bring in revenue, was further depleting the diminishing elephant population (2).

## ILLEGAL TRADE - THE ROUTE SOUTHWARDS

Namibia has served as a convenient transit route for poached ivory from neighbouring countries (1).

During the 1980s Namibia was home to Frama Intertrading, the South African Defence Force (SADF) 'front' company set up ostensibly to supply Unita rebels and export teak to South Africa, but which also smuggled ivory into South Africa in vast quantities. The network set up by Frama still exists (see South Africa section).

In late 1990 a poaching and smuggling ring was uncovered in southern Angola. The ivory was being smuggled into northern Namibia (3). Press articles from 1991 report that ivory is still moving from Angola through Namibia (4).

In February 1991, EIA learned that a US citizen visits Namibia once a year to buy up gems and to arrange for ivory to be shipped out of South Africa. His contact stockpiles ivory brought in from Angola via the Caprivi Strip, down through Namibia and into South Africa. The 'goods' are then concealed in a container and shipped from Cape Town (5). Once in the US, the ivory is passed off as 'walrus ivory'.

On 6th July 1991 a Namibian doctor, Dr Dries Gouws, was caught by the ESPU at a South African airport with 9 tusks, thought to have originated in Angola, in the boot of his car. The arrest, which happened as Dr Gouws was leaving for a hunting trip in Zambia, came nearly two years after EIA first learned of the "flying doctor's" activities.

On 14th October 1991, a Namibian farmer was arrested after he flew into Cape Town to pick up payment for 37 elephant tusks which his accomplices had tried to sell in Johannesburg. The accomplices had already been arrested (6).

# NAMIBIA

## THE WORLD'S BIGGEST SEIZURE

*Unita is still involved in supplying ivory to raise funds.*

On 16th September 1989, the South West African (now Namibian) police seized a truck containing 972 elephant tusks near Okahandja, north of Windhoek. The 'bust' was heralded as the biggest in the world (7,8). Twenty-five people were arrested following enquiries that spread from Angola through to South Africa. According to news reports, the tusks came from elephants in Angola, Zaire and Namibia itself. Destined for South Africa, (7), the ivory was believed to have belonged to Unita (9).

### TWO OF THE CULPRITS 'ESCAPE'

Paolo Antonio and Victor Manuel Martins Darocha jumped bail after being arrested and apparently fled the country. It was rumoured in Windhoek that the men had been helped to escape and that their disappearance came as 'a relief to certain authorities' (10). Colonel Breytenbach told EIA, "they said to the police if they were going to jail...they were going to spill the beans and tell them everything they knew about the whole situation". He was referring to the SADF's Frama pipeline (see South Africa section).

### A THIRD IS PARDONED

In April 1991, almost two years after the seizure, Alcino Novais da Costa, a Portuguese-speaking Namibian national, had his 5-year prison sentence set aside. Although da Costa was guilty, the court, in a spectacular display of disregard for wildlife and for the seriousness of the offence, decided that, as a family man who 'commanded the respect' of his neighbours, he should be let off with community service: a prison sentence might damage his business interests (11).

## JOAQUIM AUGUSTO - SUPPLYING UNITA FROM NAMIBIA

The truck involved in the Okahandja seizure belonged to Joaquim ("Joel") da Silva Augusto (12). One of the richest men in Namibia, Augusto collaborated with Unita and has "a massive warehouse at Rundu", close to the Angola border. From there, he supplied Unita's Jamba base (12). According to local sources, Augusto took over supplying Unita when Frama Intertrading was disbanded by the SADF, following a disagreement between Frama's two directors, Arlindo Maia and Jose Lopes Francisco.

Augusto also piloted the plane carrying Joao Soares, son of the Portuguese president, which crashed on take-off at Jamba in 1989 and was alleged to have ivory on board (12).

## UNITA STILL SMUGGLING IVORY VIA NAMIBIA

In January 1992, an EIA investigator in Angola reported that Unita is still involved in supplying ivory to raise funds. They transport ivory mainly through Namibia and Botswana and smuggle it out via Namibe port (13).

This was corroborated by a second source just back from Angola, who said it was common knowledge. Because humanitarian and election funds are being closely monitored, Unita is continuing to poach elephants in order to raise money (14).

▼ Poached Rhino in Etosha National Park / T. Stoddart / Katz



## MALAWI

Malawi's elephant population has dropped from 4,500 in 1979 to 2,075 today and poaching occurs frequently in many of Malawi's parks and reserves.

According to Mr Simon Mnthali, the regional wildlife officer for northern Malawi, illegal trade is on the increase (1), and the country has been used extensively as a conduit for poached ivory.

In spite of this, Malawi has taken a reservation to the international ban, has joined SACIM and is pressing for an Appendix II listing for its elephants.

Malawi has expressed the hope that tourism in the country will increase. Agreeing to sell ivory through SACIM will ensure that there will be even fewer elephants left for tourists to see.

## MALAWI'S ELEPHANTS DISAPPEARING

Malawi's elephants are in decline. According to the latest figures, there are now just 2,075 left (2), less than half of the number in 1979 (3).

In 1989, a government report stated that "poaching is common in all parks, game reserves and forest reserves" and that it was particularly heavy in Kasungu National Park on the Zambia border and Liwonde National Park (4). Tadeyo Shaba, an officer of the Parks and Wildlife Service, has said that poachers, using sophisticated weapons, use middlemen to reach lucrative markets abroad (4).

Malawian poachers also poach elephants in neighbouring Zambia and carry the ivory back into Malawi, where it is often buried until it can be sold (5).

US Investigators recently found two elephant carcasses in Malawi, on the Zambia border (4).


## MALAWI - RENAMO'S SECOND HOME

Malawi is in a unique position to serve as a collecting point for ivory from all over the region, and this is how it is viewed by many South African officials and conservationists. Malawi has very good relations with South Africa, and has helped considerably in supporting Renamo, the South Africa-backed rebel organisation. Malawi is Renamo's 'home from home'. Documents captured at Renamo bases have detailed the ways in which Malawi has served the organisation. According to news reports Max Lunguzi, a Malawian secret police agent, acted as co-ordinator of aid to the rebel organisation (6).

Paulo Oliveira, former Renamo spokesman in Lisbon, handed himself over to the Mozambican authorities in March 1988. He claimed that he had received several messages from Renamo chiefs referring to 'white material', which was to be sent to Malawi for onward shipment to Lisbon (7).

Malawi's good relationship with South Africa means that traffic between the two countries is constant. A source interviewed by EIA investigators said that he was employed as truck driver, carrying funds and explosives, labelled "spare parts", from South Africa to Malawi. He operated out of a front company in Malawi (8).

EIA investigators were told that 'runners' working for Mozambican refugees in Malawi move ivory into South Africa (9).



## ILLEGAL TRADE INCREASING

On 24th January 1992, Wakisa Mwasokwa and a Malawian army major were both arrested by the Malawi police at a roadblock outside Lilongwe. They were carrying 112 tusks, which they were 'selling' to an undercover team from South Africa's Endangered Species Protection Unit, working with the Malawi police.

The story began in March 1991, in the small Malawian town of Mzuzu, where investigators were offered large quantities of ivory. According to a local dealer, much of the ivory is buried in caches around Mzuzu (10). Another dealer in Mzuzu, who offered the investigating team three and a half tonnes of ivory, said that some of it was poached in the Nyika Game Reserve, which borders on Zambia, and some came from Zambia itself.

The dealer, Wakisa Mwasokwa, introduced the team to some poachers who said that the openness of the Malawi-Zambia border made their job very easy.

▼ Wakisa Mwasokwa  
Watts / EIA



# MALAWI



▲ Major Piet Lategan (right) of the ESPU posing as a buyer in Malawi / ESPU

Mwasokwa said he had an army contact who would provide a military vehicle to transport the ivory from Mzuzu down to Lilongwe. From there, it would be moved to South Africa. It was during their attempt to carry out this plan that they were finally caught.

In April 1991, an EIA investigator in Johannesburg was offered ten tonnes by a dealer on a visit from Malawi. Leonard Chingattie Chirwa said that he could use Walkers Transport of Lilongwe to move the ivory to South Africa, since they were reliable and discreet and he had used them before. Chirwa, who had both a Malawian and a South African passport, claimed to be a personal friend of the Malawian President.

Chirwa said that all his ivory had been poached in Malawi but, given the size of the elephant population, and given that a great deal of ivory generally appeared to be available in Malawi, it seems much more likely that at least some of this ivory had been brought in from Mozambique. Refugees crossing and re-crossing the border are said to be trafficking ivory and gems for dealers in Malawi (8).

Officials in South Africa refer to a very large 'Malawian syndicate' of ivory smugglers. Three Malawians - Jo, Isaac and Edward Mulangeni - carried ivory from Malawi to Johannesburg and attempted to sell it to South African undercover officials. They were arrested (11).

One source stated in February 1991 that, four months previously, one of his associates had visited Chikangwa in Malawi, where he had witnessed pieces of elephant tusk with fresh blood on them falling from a container which was being loaded in a warehouse. The source said that Glen's Cartage is one of the transport companies which carry ivory out of Malawi to South Africa (11).

Another source said that, around September 1990, a contact of his had seen about 120-180 tusks in a warehouse on the lake in Malawi, from where it was shipped to South Africa and on to Hong Kong. It was owned by an Irishman who had already moved 3 shipments to South Africa (11).

A southern African official told EIA that, in August 1990, a container full of ivory from Malawi had been driven via Botswana to Durban, South Africa, and had managed to evade the authorities. A Malawian based in Gaborone, who frequently carries ivory from Malawi to Botswana, was involved in the shipment. The ivory is usually concealed in the truck until it arrives in Gaborone, where it is then transferred to a container before crossing into South Africa (11).

The flow of ivory is not only from Malawi directly to South Africa. EIA investigators in Zimbabwe were told that ivory and rhino horns were transported from Malawi to Lusaka and then flown to Swaziland. This route had been 'going on at a much steadier rate than previously confirmed' (12). Another route shows ivory going from northern Zimbabwe to Lusaka, and from there to Malawi for a flight to Swaziland or Mozambique (12).

In March 1990, Malawian police appealed to the general public to help them to track down ivory poachers who had been involved in armed conflict with game scouts. Two of the men were Mozambicans (13).

► Air waybill showing half a tonne of Burundi ivory being flown to the Ivory Coast via Belgium on 30/10/91

062 604 3110 3054		062 6116 3054	
Shipper's Name and Address <b>TRANSITRA BURUNDI</b> B.P. 1306 BUJUMBURA P/C IBRAHIM		Shipper's Account Number	
Not negotiable <b>Air Waybill</b> Issued by <b>SABENA</b> BELGIAN WORLD AIRLINES MEMBER OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION		Copies 1, 2 and 3 of this Air Waybill are originals and have the same validity	
Consignee's Name and Address <b>M. TAHAY CAMARA</b> 05 ABIDJAN B.P. 1025 ABIDJAN TRICHEVILLE 05 COTE D'IVOIRE		Consignee's Account Number	
It is agreed that the goods described herein are accepted in apparent good order and condition (except as noted) for carriage SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON THE REVERSE HEREOF. THE SHIPPER'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIERS' LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Shipper may increase such limitation of liability by declaring a higher value for carriage and paying a supplemental charge if required.		Accounting Information <b>INVOICE</b> <b>ABJISN</b>	
Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City <b>TRANSITRA BURUNDI</b> B.P. 1306 BUJUMBURA		Agent's IATA Code <b>IA 7882</b>	
Airport of Departure (Addr. of First Carrier) and Requested Routing <b>BUJUMBURA</b>		to <b>BRU</b> By First Carrier <b>SABENA</b> to <b>ABJ</b> by <b>SN</b> to <b>ABJ</b> by <b>SN</b>	
Airport of Destination <b>ABIDJAN</b>		Flight/Date <b>SN 561</b> <b>31/10</b>	
Handling Information <b>6 COETS</b>		Declared Value for Carriage <b>NVD</b>	
No. of Pieces RCP		Gross Weight	
Rate Class Commodity Item No.		Chargeable Weight	
Chargeable		Rate	
Total		Declared Value for Customs	
Nature and Quantity of Goods (Inc. Dimensions or Volume)		<b>126 Gls H = 10/0486</b>	

## BURUNDI

Burundi's current stockpile of 84 tonnes has hit the headlines again - this time because of an attempt by South African businessmen to buy it.

Over the past fifteen years, Burundi has set an international record for ivory exports from an African country with no elephants.

Between 1975 and 1988, at least 2,000 tonnes of ivory - worth hundreds of millions of dollars - was smuggled into Burundi. From there, it was flown to a number of far eastern destinations via Belgium and the United Arab Emirates (1).

In 1986, eighty-nine tonnes of Burundi's stockpile was legalised by the Secretariat, in exchange for an undertaking to join CITES. This did not happen for another two years, by which time a further 500 tonnes had been smuggled into Burundi (1).

At the CITES meeting in 1989, amid great controversy, Burundi attempted to obtain a special exemption to allow it to sell its stockpile, which had been poached in neighbouring countries.

The attempt failed, but this has not deterred the government from negotiating to sell the ivory even under the current ban on trade.

## BURUNDI SELLS ITS STOCKPILE TO SOUTH AFRICANS

With flagrant disregard for CITES, Burundi has been using South African businessmen as agents to sell its stockpile of 84.25 tonnes, held in a Bujumbura military camp since 1988. The ivory was advertised for sale in May 1991 by a Hong Kong company, Minden International. Two South Africans, Michael Loubser and Cliff Erasmus, acted as agents for the sale (2,3).

Loubser is Managing Director of MPL Project Management Consultants Ltd, while Erasmus is Managing Director of Money and Management Export Ltd, both South African companies. R.F. Botha, nephew of South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha, is a co-director of Money and Management (3,4). In an interview in November 1991, Botha confirmed that Loubser and Erasmus had been negotiating with the Burundi Government for 18 months (5). Yet in June, during official meetings in the US, the Prime Minister of Burundi denied any knowledge of offers to buy the stockpile (3).

In July 1991, Loubser and Erasmus visited the CITES Secretariat in Lausanne. On the day of their visit, a fax arrived from the Burundi Prime Minister's office, notifying the Secretariat that all 84.25 tonnes had been sold to Loubser. The men were warned that sale and subsequent export of the ivory would contravene CITES regulations, but they persisted in their attempts to sell it.

In November, Loubser conducted secret negotiations from Brussels with a dealer in Johannesburg. In a recorded phone conversation, Loubser states "I have total control in Burundi for whatever I want to do there". He suggests the ivory should be flown to South Korea. An American pilot, David Park, was on stand-by. Alternatively, the pilots of two DC-6s flying under the markings of the UN Food Aid programme were willing to move the ivory for a cut of the profits. The tusks were to be loaded by the Burundi military. Over the phone, Loubser asks that payments for the ivory be made to Global Traders in Brussels.

It appears that Minden has left the scene and the Johannesburg deal has fallen through. If so, Burundi and its agents in South Africa will see SACIM as the perfect retail outlet.

Meanwhile, Belgian Customs has intercepted half a tonne of Burundi ivory on its way to the Ivory Coast. Business as usual in Burundi?

*"I have total control in Burundi for whatever I want to do there"*

Michael Loubser



◀ Cliff Erasmus, the South African buyer of the Burundi stockpile

# HONG KONG

## DOWNLISTINGS: MORE PROFIT FOR HONG KONG DEALERS ?

If southern African elephant populations are downlisted Hong Kong stockpiles of poached ivory which originated in southern Africa will be allowed back into international trade, unless special provisions are made (1). At least 16 tonnes of raw tusks have certificates originating from countries which have applied for downlisting (2). Thirteen tonnes of this is from South Africa and could immediately be released onto the international market again.

A huge amount of the ivory stockpile, said to be 40 tonnes in 1989 (3), belongs to the Rand Company, run by South Africa-based A.H. Pong (4), the man who has been freely exporting poached ivory from South Africa for years.

There are also said to be 233 tonnes of cut and worked ivory, some of which originated in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia or Botswana (2). This, too, could be legalised in the event of downlistings.

According to Hong Kong's Agriculture and Fisheries department (AFD), there are 116 tonnes in Hong Kong which have no documentation (5). If any countries are to downlist, it is likely that the documents for some of this ivory will suddenly materialise, citing southern African countries of origin.

In 1989 it was estimated that 94% of ivory leaving Africa was from poached sources (6). Unless specific provisions are made, agreeing to downlist the elephant populations of southern Africa at the eighth Conference of the Parties would be allowing many tonnes of poached Hong Kong ivory into international trade.

## BACKGROUND TO THE STOCKPILE

Before the October 1989 CITES meeting, Hong Kong's estimated 670 tonne stockpile attracted international attention. Most of this ivory had come from poached elephants and the Hong Kong ivory traders had developed an international reputation for their ability to get round any ivory 'controls' which could be devised.

In January 1990 Mr Kanemaki of the Japan General Merchandise Importers Association referred to Hong Kong as "a hotbed of illegal ivory middlemen", omitting, understandably, to mention that a great deal of Japan's ivory had been imported from Hong Kong! (7).

The UK took a 'reservation' to the CITES decision on behalf of Hong Kong; this meant that Hong Kong was exempt from the ban for a further six months after it came into effect. Since then the question of the Hong Kong stockpile has raised a number of serious questions.


### CONFUSION ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE STOCKPILE

During the six-month reservation period, 200 tonnes of ivory 'went missing' from Hong Kong. After the initial announcement of 670 tonnes, the figure was revised down to 474 tonnes. The explanation given by the AFD was that the first estimate was made by the traders who owned the stocks and the second was made by the authorities. This explanation did nothing to allay fears that the ivory had been smuggled to Japan - especially when large amounts of ivory from Hong Kong were being seized in Japan on a regular basis.

Serious doubts were raised about Hong Kong's ability to control the trade when the amount of stockpiled ivory with no documentation whatsoever turned out to be four times higher than had at first been claimed by the AFD (8).

In May 1990, a well-known ivory dealer, Lee Chat, said in a newspaper interview that 30% of the Hong Kong stocks had been sold (9).

▼ Ivory for sale in Hong Kong shop, January 1992 / Gully / EIA



# HONG KONG / JAPAN

## IVORY STILL ENTERING AND LEAVING

Most of the seizures of ivory illegally entering Japan since the ban were smuggled in from Hong Kong (see Japan section). The largest of these, consisting of 30,000 ivory hanko, was worth around \$US 700,000 (10).

On January 6th 1992, almost three-quarters of a tonne of carved ivory, worth \$US 128,000, entered Hong Kong from Cameroon. Hong Kong customs seized the ivory, labelled 'cow horn', at Kwai Chung container terminal and two Hong Kong men were arrested (11).

According to Hong Kong customs officials, only 1% of containers arriving in the colony can be checked: the amount of ivory successfully entering Hong Kong can only be guessed at.

## IVORY SHOPS BEG FOR CUSTOMERS

Reports from Hong Kong since the ban show that there are very few buyers for ivory in the shops.

Shoppers have been offered huge discounts and 'Sale' signs sprang up all over the colony shortly after the ban. People entering a number of different ivory shops to assess the situation have reported seeing no other customers, and many shops and carving factories have closed down altogether.

However, it is believed that Hong Kong traders have moved ivory to countries where there is still a flourishing tourist market, such as Peru and other Latin American countries, in an attempt to offload their stocks (12).

## IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN

Some of the Hong Kong shops which were open when EIA visited in 1991 - including Tat Hing Ivory Wares, belonging to the Poon family - reported that worked ivory was coming in from China and Taiwan (13).

The 'loss' of 200 tonnes of ivory, the prospect of many tonnes of southern African ivory being allowed back into trade and the fact that ivory is still going into Hong Kong give rise to fears of Hong Kong ivory dealers indulging in speculative buying as an investment for the future.

## JAPAN - THE BIGGEST CONSUMER THREAT

Japan has for many years been the world's largest ivory consumer, taking as much as 40% of the ivory in international trade. In the years leading up to the ban, Japan was importing an average of 100 tonnes per year, and is believed to have stockpiled 100 tonnes in anticipation of the ban (1). In spite of a significant reduction in local demand, Japan remains the single biggest consumer threat to the African elephant. Tom Milliken, then director of TRAFFIC Japan, said in May 1991 that, if ivory trade resumes, it will involve "just a few African countries and Japan" (2).

Not surprisingly, the effect of the ban on the Japanese consumer market has been mixed. When it first came into effect in January 1990, retail prices in other markets began to fall (3). In Japan, however, prices rose (3) as traders and consumers anticipated that supplies of ivory would decrease while demand remained constant.

## PRICES HAVE DROPPED

As the ban began to take hold and as some Japanese consumers responded to worldwide concern about elephant decline, both prices and consumer demand began to fall (2,3). By late 1990, consumer demand had dropped by as much as 50% (2). Reports from Japan show that, while demand for ivory jewellery and accessories has decreased enormously, ivory hanko are still very much in demand. Many department stores stopped selling accessories shortly after the ban, but continued selling stocks of hanko (4). It is estimated that the hanko market alone was responsible for the deaths of 30,000 elephants per year (1).

The look and feel of ivory is still much valued in Japan, and this is reflected in the number of companies manufacturing ivory substitutes and in Japan's importation of mammoth ivory. Consumer demand for 'the real thing', especially in the form of hanko, could easily rise to previous levels if the ban does not stay in place.

*It is estimated that the hanko market alone was responsible for the deaths of 30,000 elephants per year (1).*



◀ Seizure of 688 kgs of ivory from Cameroon on 6th January 1992. Labelled as cattle horns. / Hong Kong customs and excise

# JAPAN

## OFFICIAL INTEREST CONTINUES

*The 62 tusks had come via the Philippines in a fishing vessel and the Japanese believed that it may have been shipped from Hong Kong, representing a new, indirect trade route (10).*

In Spring 1991, two Japanese research scientists, Dr Ishii and Dr Imoto, visited southern Africa to assess the possibility of re-opening trade (5). They had been sent by the Japanese Management Authority to visit South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Their focus in South Africa was Kruger Park ivory, in the light of South Africa's claim to be able to determine scientifically the exact origin of ivory.

In October 1989 EIA revealed the double dealings of Yoshio Kaneko, then a member of the CITES Secretariat, who was advising Japanese ivory traders on how best to argue against the ivory ban at an international meeting (6).

Kaneko has since left the Secretariat and returned to Japan, where he is now working for Nagao Natural Environment Foundation, which campaigns for the 'sustainable' use of wildlife. It was the Nagao Foundation which offered to pay the travel expenses of all the delegates when it was decided to hold a meeting in Zimbabwe to formulate an attack on the CITES convention (7).

## TRADE INTEREST CONTINUES

In late December 1989, despite the fact that the ban had been agreed, a group of Japanese traders was in Mozambique on an ivory buying mission. The group included Nakasone Tsujita and a colleague from the Tokyo Ivory Crafts Association (8). Mozambique has lost most of its elephants during the past 15 years of war, and has been used as a conduit for poached ivory, including ivory from Burundi.

In the second quarter of 1990 the notorious Japanese ivory dealer Takaichi advertised in a magazine circulated throughout Africa. He was looking to import raw ivory, in spite of the fact that the international ban had taken effect.

Traders such as Takaichi do not give up easily. After the Japanese import ban came into force, he was still interested in receiving a shipment from South Africa which he had ordered prior to the ban. The South African authorities tried to persuade the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry to allow Takaichi to receive the shipment (see South Africa section).

### JAPAN

#### Raw ivory tusks.

Takaichi Ivory Trading Co. Ltd, 47 Minamikyuhoji-cho, 2-chome, Higashi-ku, Osaka, Japan, fax: (06) 261-9725, telex: TAKA J65106, phone: (06) 262-0556 would like to import raw ivory tusks. For details contact M. Kanda.

### NAMIBIA

In early 1991, a group of Japanese businessmen surfaced in Burundi, attempting to buy the entire stock of poached ivory, thought to be about 85 tonnes. They returned to Japan to discuss the deal, and shortly afterwards a serious ivory related scandal broke in Japan and the men never returned (9).

## IVORY STILL BEING SMUGGLED IN

Since the implementation of the ban, there has been a series of seizures of ivory entering Japan, and at least ten of these were from Hong Kong (10). They consisted mainly of hanko and other worked pieces.

In June 1990, customs officers at Nata port, Okinawa, became suspicious when they noticed three shipments from Hong Kong labelled 'ceramic lions'. The first contained cosmetics but the other two contained a total of 31,700 hanko (11).

In February 1990, six people - Japanese and Taiwanese - were apprehended when a consignment of 12,000 hanko was intercepted by Japanese customs officers in Kobe. The hanko had been hidden inside 'pillow stuffing' and shipped from Taiwan. Kyouji Hamano of Guddo Co., Hidekazu Otsuka of Chinsu Mat Weaving Co. and Haruhiko Idaka of Idaka Co. were reported to have been arrested (12).

In April 1990, a shipment of ivory items, including 4,000 hanko, was seized by Yokohama Customs officers as it arrived from Hong Kong. The shipment had reportedly been consigned to Yamato Trading in Tokyo (13).

A consignment of ivory intercepted in April 1991 was not only the first ever seizure of raw ivory entering Japan but the largest Japanese seizure on record (14). The 62 tusks had come via the Philippines in a fishing vessel and the Japanese believed that it may have been shipped from Hong Kong, representing a new, indirect trade route (10).

In September 1990, 77kg of ivory from Hong Kong was seized at Narita airport (15).

## DEMAND WILL OUTSTRIP SUPPLY

There will be considerable interest among the Japanese ivory traders in the possibility of trade re-opening. If it does, there will be a price on the head of every elephant in Africa. The southern African countries say that, between them, they can produce around 25 tonnes of 'legal' ivory annually (16). Japan's yearly demand is 100 tonnes. The remaining 75 tonnes per year will come, as it did before the ban, from elephants poached right across Africa.

► Takaichi advertisement in African Connexion magazine, volume five - second quarter 1990



## ZAMBIA

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Some of the information contained in this report is by its nature sensitive. Consequently the authors of the report have respected the wishes of sources to remain confidential where appropriate.

## GLOSSARY

**CITES** - Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, a UN Treaty signed by 112 countries which regulates and governs trade in endangered species. It has three levels of control:

Appendix I, the highest, includes all species threatened with extinction, and bans trade in these species for commercial purposes. Appendix II, for threatened species, allows commercial trade under strict monitoring, if the exporting country is satisfied that any trade is not detrimental to the future survival of that species.

**CoP to CITES** - Conference of the Parties to CITES. The biennial meetings of CITES. Kyoto will be the 8th meeting.

**AECCG** - African Elephant Conservation Coordinating Group.

**ADMAD** - Administrative Management and Design. A Zambian project coordinated by ZNPWS to involve local people in wildlife conservation.

**Campfire** - Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources. Zimbabwean project to involve local people in wildlife conservation.

**DNPWM** - Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management. (Zimbabwe).

**ESPU** - Endangered Species Protection Unit of the South African police.

**Frelimo** - the ruling party in Mozambique.

**MPLA** - Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola. The ruling party in Angola.

**Renamo** - Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana. Rebel group fighting against the Frelimo government in Mozambique.

**SACIM** - Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing. A consortium of Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, who wish to establish a trade market for ivory.

**SADCC** - Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference.

**SADF** - South African Defense Force.

**Unita** - Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola. One of the groups fighting for control of post independent Angola.

**ZNA** - Zimbabwe National Army.

**ZNPWS** - Zambia National Parks and Wildlife Service.

# CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All populations of African elephants should remain on Appendix I of CITES for at least the next fifteen years to allow elephant populations to recover.

2. The CITES Parties should not allow any quotas for commercial trade in any product of the African elephant, be it ivory or skins.

3. The governments of Zimbabwe and South Africa should set up independent enquiries into involvement of their military personnel in poaching and ivory smuggling and take appropriate action. The international community should take an active interest in negotiating a peace agreement in Mozambique as a prerequisite for meaningful conservation measures.

4. Ivory stockpiles in African range states should be destroyed and nations should be compensated on a once only basis for destroying such stocks. Compensation should be restricted for use in elephant conservation programmes. Compensation should be paid by the former ivory consuming nations in Europe, the US, Japan and by the ivory trading nations, especially United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, Hong Kong and People's Republic of China.

5. Non consumptive use of elephants should be emphasised to maximise economic earnings of range states. International financial institutions should be encouraged to provide capital investment for ecologically sound tourist infrastructure in range states.

6. The CITES Parties should take measures to further strengthen and expand the enforcement

capability of the CITES Secretariat. Regular meetings of national enforcement agencies should be arranged to exchange information and co-ordinate efforts to tackle illegal trade in ivory. Funding should be provided for a regional database.

7. Range states should be strongly encouraged to implement national elephant conservation programmes which will ensure the long term survival of elephants. Conservation measures should include establishment of ecological corridors to allow natural historical migration routes to be maintained.

8. Priority should be given to research leading to the identification and protection of such ecological corridors which cross national boundary lines.

9. Urgent measures must be taken to restrict killing of elephants for the purposes of 'problem animal control'. Abuses should be countered through legislative and administrative measures. Further research into non-lethal methods of dealing with problem animals should be encouraged.

10. Sport hunting of elephants, although non-commercial in the CITES definition, should only be allowed if agreed to by CITES in the form of a resolution setting strict limits on numbers that can be legally hunted.

11. Regional management plans should be developed for any population of elephants which crosses from one national jurisdiction into that of a neighbouring country.

▼ Gleizes/EIA



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